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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper was to determine whether the current South African law governing 
the doctrine of pacta de non cedendo complies with the constitutional mandates imposed by our 
Constitution.  
In terms of the current law a pactum de non cedendo will only be accorded validity if the 
debtor is able to demonstrate a substantial interest in the prohibition against cession. However, 
the interest requirement is only applicable when a pactum de non cedendo is superimposed 
onto a pre-existing right, and is not required when a right is born ab initio with a prohibition on 
transfer. 
In my opinion the current law falls short of the “spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights”, as required by s 39(2) of the Constitution, and is therefore, in need of development. In 
this paper I propose the following development:  Firstly, by requiring the debtor to prove an 
interest that is served by the pactum de non cedendo, in certain circumstances, the law 
undermines the value of equality held so dearly by our society. This is because no such 
requirement exists when other types of restrictive clauses are concluded. It is my contention that 
the „interest requirement‟ be relegated from being a free-standing requirement to simply being 
another factor to be taken into account when conducting the public policy enquiry.  
Secondly, pacta de non cedendo appearing in book debts and other similar monetary 
obligations should always be held contrary to public policy due to the importance of the free flow 
of claims in commerce, specifically, the factoring and securitisation industries. Factoring plays a 
crucial role in the world economy, the most advantageous aspect of factoring is that small to 
medium size businesses may obtain much needed finance by selling their claims to a factoring 
house. 
Lastly, the current distinction drawn between a pactum de non cedendo that is 
superimposed onto a pre-existing right, and a right that is created with a pactum de non 
cedendo is artificial and illogical, the correct distinction that should be drawn is between a 
pactum de non cedendo that is concluded by the debtor and creditor on the one hand, and 
between a pactum de non cedendo concluded between the cedent and cessionary on the other. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In light of the developments in factoring/discounting and securitisation, claims 
have emerged as the most important class of assets in commerce.1 Factoring and 
securitisation are undoubtedly two of the most important cogs in the commercial wheel 
and constitute multi-trillion dollar industries globally.2 Agreements prohibiting the 
transferability of a right by cession (pacta de non cedendo)3, however, “throw a 
proverbial spanner in the works” of these cogs of the commercial wheel. Pacta de non 
cedendo have the potential to inhibit and stultify the growth of these powerhouse 
industries.4 
Both factoring and the securitisation of claims originate in the United States.5 In 
the U.S factoring was introduced as a method to solve the difficulties incurred in 
providing commercial credit.6 Small to medium size businesses are the major clients of 
a factoring house, often the only asset of these businesses are book debts, 
consequently, book debt financing is the only form of finance available to these 
businesses.7 To obtain credit facilities all that the business is required to do is to cede 
                                                          
I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Dale Hutchison, for all his hours he has spent 
assisting me and for all his insightful comments. 
1




 D Hutchison, Agreements in Restraint of Cession: Time for a New Approach, (2016) Stell LR 273. 
4
 K Sunkel, A Comprehensive Suggestion To Bring The Pactum De Non Cedendo Into The 21
st
 Century, (2010) 3 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 463 at 474. 
5




 R Noel et al, Salinger on Factoring 4ed, (London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 2006) pp 35 – 36. 
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its book debts to the factoring house.8 Once the business has ceded its book debts the 
factoring house thereafter owns the book debts, and is consequently entitled to legally 
enforce these debts.9 In return for ceding its claims (rights) the factoring house pays the 
client the value of the book debts less certain fees.10  
The institution of factoring provides two valuable services: firstly, the factoring 
house provides credit facilities to their clients; secondly, the factoring house also 
provides financial services.11  
Securitisation is highly complex commercial institution that may be defined as 
follows: “[it] is the process of converting illiquid claims against one‟s debtor into a 
security, that is, into a financial instrument that can be traded”.12  
Securitisations are usually coupled with a collective security arrangement, in 
terms of which security is held for the common benefit of a number of creditors.13 The 
securities that are pooled together may take various forms, and include the following: 
“suretyship, pledge, mortgage or security cession of the assets (property) of the 
borrower (debtor) or of a third party”.14 Collective security arrangements have the 
following advantages: substantial credit is provided over a longer period of time; 
                                                          
8








 Hutchison op cit note 3 at 274 footnote 7. 
13
 S Scott, An Introduction to the Securitisation of Claims Incorporating a Collective Security Arrangement, (2006) SA Merc LJ 
397. 
14
 Ibid.  
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administrative costs and taxes are reduced; the arrangement is less risk averse, and 
efficiency is increased.15 
Securitisation is a financial technique that has the following basic construction: 
similar claims (such as book debts, instalment sale agreements, lease agreements, 
mortgage bonds and consumer loans) are pooled together so that they may be sold to 
an entity created for the specific purpose of acquiring such claims.16 The seller and 
holder of these assets is known as the „originator‟, and the buyer to whom these assets 
are sold and transferred to is known as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).17 In order to 
fund the sale of the assets the Special Purpose Vehicle issues commercial paper to 
investors.18 
 
1.1 Constitutional Framework 
Cession straddles both the law of property and the law of obligations 
simultaneously, and consequently forms part of private law.19 The law of property is 
involved because cession concerns the transfer of an asset.20 Cession involves the law 
of obligations, as cession has the effect of substituting one creditor for another.21  




 Ibid 403. 
17
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Due to the great emphasis placed on the bifurcation between private law and 
public law it may seem somewhat paradoxical to discuss the application of constitutional 
law to an area of private law.22  
With the adoption of the interim Constitution23 in 1994 and the final Constitution24 
in 1996 South Africa‟s constitutional revolution was initiated, by abolishing parliamentary 
sovereignty and replacing it with the notion of constitutional supremacy.25 In S v 
Makwanyane26 the Constitutional Court held that in the vertical sphere, that is, between 
the State and its citizens, the rights in the Bill of Rights could be directly relied on in 
challenging the constitutional validity of state action.27 However, in the horizontal 
sphere, that is, cases involving private parties, it was uncertain whether and to what 
extent the Constitution, specifically, the Bill of Rights, could be directly invoked. In other 
words, it was uncertain to what extent the Constitution applied to Private Law. 
In the seminal decision of Carmichele28 the Constitutional Court held that South 
Africa‟s Constitution not only regulates public power, as the Constitution encompasses 
what was referred to as an „objective value system‟.29 Therefore, the Constitution 
contains both defensive subjective rights for individuals, as well as an objective value 
                                                          
22
 A Price, The Influence of Human Rights on Private Common Law, (2012) 129 SALJ 330. 
23
 Constitution, Act 200 of 1993. 
24
 Constitution, Act 108 of 1996.  
25
 P De Vos, et al, South African Constitutional Law in Context, (Oxford University Press Southern Africa, 2014) pp 26-27. 
26




 Carmichele v Minister of safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 54. 
29
 Ibid. 
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system.30 This objective value system is a fundamental constitutional value which is 
applicable to all areas of law, and provides guidance to all three branches of the State.31 
Furthermore, the court stated that “the influence of the fundamental constitutional 
values on the common law is mandated by s 39(2) of the Constitution.”32  Section 39(2) 
states that: “when developing the common law… every court… must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of rights”.33 The court held that development of the law in 
terms of s 39(2) should be conducted within the matrix of the objective normative value 
system.34 It is therefore, clear that the Constitution contains both rights and values. 
The Constitutional Court, therefore, made it abundantly clear that the 
Constitution, at least its objective normative value system, applies to all law, including 
the private common law. Therefore, the Constitution does apply in the horizontal 
sphere.  
There are, however, a number of theories on the horizontal application of 
constitutional rights, and determining which theory to apply is of central importance to 
any legal system.35 South African Law has adopted the indirect application model in 
Private Law. In Barkhuizen36 the Constitutional Court stated that the Bill of Rights 








 Constitution supra note 24. 
34
 Carmichele supra note 28. 
35
 A Barak, Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law, in D Friedmann & D Barak-Erez, Human Rights in Private Law (2001) 
13. 
36
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
P a g e  | 10 
 
applies indirectly in the context of an agreement concluded between private parties.37 In 
terms of this model constitutional rights are applicable in private law, although their 
application is indirect.38 A constitutional inlet is provided by pre-existing doctrines or the 
creation of new doctrines.39 The most advantageous aspect of this model is that it does 
not create a new parallel system of human rights, but instead works within the pre-
existing private common law.40 For example, the concept of public policy has always 
attempted to strike a balance between competing human rights, the fundamental 
difference is that these rights have now been endowed with constitutional status.41 In 
other words, the constitutional status of these rights have increased their normative 
status, and consequently these rights are given an increased weight in private law.42 
“[T]he obligation of the courts to develop the common law, in the context of section 39(2) 
objectives, is not purely discretionary. On the contrary, it is implicit in section 39(2) read 
with section 173 that where the common law as it stands is deficient in promoting the 
section 39(2) objectives, the courts are under a general obligation to develop it 
appropriately”.43 
1.2 Current law on pacta de non cedendo 
                                                          
37
 Ibid paras 29 -30. 
38










 De Vos op cit note 25 at 342. 
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One of the requirements for a valid cession is that the right being ceded is 
capable of being transferred.44 The general rule is that all personal rights are 
transferable.45 There are, however, a number of exceptions to this general rule.46 One 
of which is the pactum de non cedendo.47 A pactum de non cedendo is a clause 
prohibiting the transferability of right by cession.48  
A pactum de non cedendo has the potential to prevent both an „out-and-out‟ 
cession as well as a security cession.49 An out-and-out cession is defined as a bilateral 
juristic act whereby a right is transferred by mere agreement between the transferor, 
termed a cedent, and the transferee, termed a cessionary.50 Cession in securitatem 
debiti is the conditional cession of a right for security purposes, usually as security for a 
debt.51 
Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates Ltd52 is still considered the leading case on 
the validity and effect of a pactum de non cedendo.53 The court in this case held that the 
validity of the pactum de non cedendo depended on whether the prohibition against 
                                                          
44




 Ibid. Other exceptions are: where the transferability of a personal right is restricted by statute; rights that are intensely 






 Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en n Ander v Booyens 2001 (4) 15 (SCA). 
50
 Hippo Quarries (Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley 1992 (1) SA 867 (A). 
51
 D Hutchison et al, The Law of Contract in South Africa, 2ed (Oxford, University Press, South Africa, 2012) pg 368. 
52
 1920 AD 600. See also the prior decision in South African Railways v The Universal Stores Ltd 1914 TPD. 
53
 Hutchison op cit note 3 at pg 276. 
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transfer served a legitimate interest or purpose of the debtor, if it did then it would be 
valid and binding between the debtor and creditor subject to the prohibition, and by 
virtue of the nemo plus iuris rule54, it would also be effective against third parties, that is, 
any purported transfer to a third party would be completely ineffectual.  
The debate as to the correct legal principles and theoretical underpinnings of 
pacta de non cedendo has raged on for almost a hundred years.55 This debate has 
been re-ignited by two landmark decisions: Capespan56 and Born Free Investments57.58 
The topic, however, remains a conceptually taxing area of study, in which legal opinions 
continue to differ.59 Both of the respective courts in the aforementioned cases appeared 
to accept the correctness of the law as enunciated by Scott in 1991, where she states 
the following: 
“The correct approach should be the following: a clear distinction should be drawn 
between a pactum de non cedendo in relation to existing rights, and one in relation to a 
right which is created as a non-transferable right. In relation to existing rights, the views 
of Sande and Voet should be followed in regard to both the validity and the effect of a 
                                                          
54
 Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet (nobody can transfer any greater right than he himself has). 
55
 S Scott, The Law of Cession 2ed, (Juta & Co Ltd, 1991) pp 205 ff; N Joubert, Die Regsbetrekkinge by Krediefaktorering, (LLD 
thesis, Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, 1985); GF Lubbe et al, Contract Cases Materials Commentary 3
rd
 ed, (Juta & Co Ltd, 1988) 
pp 654-656; N Joubert, Boekskuldfinansiering en Pacta de non Cedendo, (1986) Modern Business Law 109; S Scott, Pacta de non 
Cedendo, (1981) THRHR 148; S Scott, Sessie en Factoring in Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, (1987) De Jure 15; SR Roussouw, Pacta de non 
Cedendo, (1991) Responsa Meridiana 52; Van Huyssteen et al, Contract General Principles 5
th
 ed (Juta, 2016) pp 451-453.  
56
 Capespan (Pty) Ltd v Any Name 451 (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 510 (C). 
57
 Born Free Investments 364 (Pty) Ltd v Firstrand Bank Limited [2014] 2 All SA 127 (SCA).  
58
 Scott op cit note 1; S Scott, Sessieverbiedende Ooreenkomste en die Posisie van die Kurator of Likwidateur by Insolvensie, 
(2008) TSAR 776; Sunkel op cit note 4; GF Lubbe, Cession in LAWSA, 3
rd
  ed (2013) par 164; K Sunkel, The Pactum de non 
Cedendo: A Re-evaluation, (LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2009); Hutchison op cit note 3. 
59
 Hutchison op cit note 3 at 273. 
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pactum de non cedendo. In other words, as such an agreement is contrary to the basic 
principle of the law of property that a res in commercio should not be withdrawn from 
commercial dealings, a good reason is required, or, as the courts interpret it, the person 
in whose favour the restraint is operating should have an interest in the agreement. The 
effect of such an agreement is that it is binding only on the parties to the agreement and 
a breach thereof results in a claim for damages the right, however, passes to the 
cessionary. 
In relation to a right which is created as a non-transferable right, a pactum de non 
cedendo is valid as the principle of freedom of contract is paramount here and therefore 
the requirement that the debtor should have an interest in the agreement is 
unnecessary. A cession contrary to such an agreement is of no force and effect even in 
the event of involuntary cessions, as the nature of the right is such that it is not 
transferable”.60 
In light of the fact that the Born Free Investments decision was decided by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal the law as stated in that case has become the precedent. In 
my opinion the law as stated in this case is completely unconvincing and entirely 
artificial. The distinction drawn between a pre-existing right, in terms of which a pactum 
de non cedendo is superimposed onto, and a right which is created ab initio as non-
transferable, is illogical.  
 
1.3 My conceptual analysis 
                                                          
60
 Scott (1991) op cit note 55 at 212 – 213; Scott ‘Pacta’ op cit note 55 at 160; Scott op cit note 1 at 782. 
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In my opinion much of the confusion surrounding the validity and effect of pacta de 
non cedendo may be alleviated by following a two-step approach.61 Firstly, the validity 
of the pactum de non cedendo inter partes should be determined. If the pactum de non 
cedendo is valid inter partes a second enquiry should be undertaken to determine the 
effectiveness of the pactum de non cedendo against third parties, that is, it should be 
determined whether the pactum de non cedendo has the effect of preventing transfer to 
a potential cessionary. 
(i) Validity inter partes 
There are at least two potential bases upon which a pactum de non cedendo could 
be rendered invalid inter partes62:  
(a) The interest requirement 
Firstly, if the pactum de non cedendo does not serve a real and/or legitimate interest 
of the debtor it will be held to be invalid.63 Since the judgment in Paiges the practical 
utility of the interest requirement has been questioned.64 Furthermore, others have 
argued, most notably, JC De Wet, that the debtor will always have an interest in 
knowing the identity of his creditor thus rendering the requirement superfluous.65 While 
it must be acknowledged that the debtor will have an interest in knowing who his 
creditor is so as, inter alia, to avoid the risk of double payment, watering down the 
                                                          
61
 This two stage analysis has been borrowed from Hutchison op cit note 3 at 273-274.  
62
 Paiges supra note 52. 
63
 Ibid 615. 
64
 RS Welsh, General Principles of Contract, (1950) Annual Survey of South African Law 75 at 83. 
65
 JC De Wet and AH Van Wyk, Kontraktereg 4ed (1993) 254. 
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interest requirement in this manner is certainly not what was envisaged by the court in 
Paiges.66 It is not simply any interest that will suffice, what is required is a “substantial 
interest”.67 Let us look at two examples to amplify what is meant by “substantial 
interest”. 
Example1: a company issues a special class of shares to satisfy its Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) requirements.68 The company restricts the transfer of these 
shares to anyone outside of the designated class. It is clearly uncontentious that the 
debtor (the company) has a substantial interest in restricting the transferability of these 
rights. 
Example 2: Dr. X is a general medical practitioner. Her clients all pay her using their 
respective medical aid schemes. Dr. X sells all her claims against the various medical 
aids to Y. Y later discovers that all the claims concerned are subject to a pactum de non 
cedendo. Do the medical aids (debtors) have a substantial interest in restricting the 
transferability of their respective claims? Surely not. Provided of course that all the 
medical aids received notice of the change in creditor, does it really make a difference 
whether the medical aid pays Dr. X or Y? In my opinion the interest of the debtor in this 
example is certainly not “substantial”.  
 
(b) Public Policy 
                                                          
66




 Ibid 284. 
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Secondly, because the pactum de non cedendo is a contract in its own right it must 
comply with the requirements for a valid contract. The most important requirement in 
this regard, for our purposes, is legality.  
It is often stated by the courts that contracts are illegal because they are contra 
bonos mores or because they are contrary to public policy.69 There is no value in 
distinguishing between these two concepts, as there is often overlap between the 
underlying principles of both concepts.70 
In the law of contract the underlying principle is that all agreements seriously entered 
into must be enforced. This principle is encapsulated in the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda.71 Furthermore, in terms of the notion of freedom of contract parties “are free 
to decide on whether, with whom and on what terms to contract”.72 However, freedom of 
contract has always been limited by public policy.73 Public policy has become firmly 
entrenched as a mechanism for judicial control over the enforcement of contractual 
obligations.74 A court may refuse to enforce contractual provisions or even an entire 
contract, if it considers the impugned provision or contract to be contrary to public 
                                                          
69




 Ibid 175. 
72
 Ibid 21. 
73
 Ibid 175. 
74
 M Kruger, The Role of Public Policy in the Law of Contract Revisited, (2011) SALJ 712. 
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policy, despite the fact that the contractual terms have been freely and voluntarily 
concluded.75  
The doctrine of public policy places great power in the hands of the judiciary, and 
with great power comes great responsibility, as Kruger notes:  
“…the power provided by the doctrine is often criticised because it entails the application 
of value-laden and seemingly subjective policy considerations, including those of 
fairness, justice and equity, and therefore has the potential, when applied 
indiscriminately, to result in commercial uncertainty”.76 
It is important to take cognisance of the fact that because public policy 
represents public opinion at a particular point in time, public opinion may change over 
time.77 In other words, public policy is an open-ended standard.78 However, since the 
inception of South Africa‟s constitutional revolution in 1994 public policy has been 
rooted in the Constitution and the rights and values enshrined in the Bill of Rights, 
although it is not the only source of public policy.79  
Public policy is a broad concept, which takes cognisance not only of the interest 
of the debtor, but also the interests of all parties affected by the transaction, as well as 
the social and economic impact of the clause or agreement in issue.80 In this regard 






 F Du Bois et al, Wille’s Principles of South African Law, (2010, Juta, 9
th






 Hutchison op cit note 3 at 283. 
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public policy has been held to include fairness, justice and reasonableness.81 In Sasfin v 
Beukes82 Smalberger JA held that “agreements which are clearly inimical to the 
interests of the community, whether they are contrary to law or morality, or run counter 
to social or economic expedience, will on grounds of public policy not be enforced”.83 
Even though numerous cases have laid down general statements in relation to 
when public policy is applicable, and are replete with warnings against the overzealous 
application of this doctrine, very little guidance is provided by the courts on how exactly 
this doctrine is to be applied.84 This has increased the legal uncertainty created in the 
application of the doctrine of public policy.85 However, the lack of clarity on how to apply 
the doctrine is not fatal.86 In fact it is commensurate with the nature of public policy as a 
standard-orientated concept that is context-dependent.87 The flexibility inherent in the 
concept of public policy and its adaptability to changing times is in fact one of its best 
qualities.88 “As such, there is no defined process to be constructed, no check-list to be 
marked-off by judges, or bright-line to mark in advance what will be contrary to public 
policy”.89  
                                                          
81
 Ibid 30. 
82
 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) at 8D. 
83
 Hutchison op cit note 3 at 283. 
84










 Ibid 714. 
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The absence of a clear methodology in the application of the public policy 
enquiry may be said to introduce an intolerable amount of uncertainty into the law, and 
that the concept of public policy is simply being used as a veil to cover the subjective 
unsubstantiated views of the presiding officer.90 This view, however, fails to take 
cognisance of the fact that uncertainty may arise in any interpretation and application of 
the law, irrespective of whether we are applying rules of law, as opposed to open-ended 
standards and norms.91 Value judgments are made in other areas of law, and in order to 
reduce the inherent uncertainty entailed in the application of these value judgments 
judicial and extra-judicial steps are undertaken.92 There is no reason why these steps 
should not be applied in the public policy enquiry as well.93 
Public policy is a difficult concept to define, however, at a rudimentary level 
public policy is a mechanism in terms of which the views of society are given expression 
to by the courts, and thereby ensures that society has a certain measure of control over 
private contractual relations.94  
Devoid of context public policy has little or no substantive meaning.95 As 
Sutherland has pointed out, it operates as “a collection of general principles and more 










 Ibid 715. 
95
 Ibid. 
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specific rules of contract law”.96 Public policy refers to the examination of these 
principles and rules, which enables the courts to give content and meaning to the 
concept of public policy.97 
The inherently flexible nature of the public policy enquiry, coupled with the fact 
that courts are always open to consider new factors, means that there is no numerus 
clausus of considerations a judge may take into account when engaging in the 
enquiry.98 This conceptual understanding of the public policy enquiry means that a 
judge undertaking this enquiry is equipped with a “basket” of existing, and may even 
add new, public policy considerations.99 “From this “basket” she is required, in a given 
case, to choose those considerations which are relevant to the facts of the case, and 
then to balance those considerations against each other so as to determine whether the 
particular contractual terms should be enforced. The outcome of this identification and 
balancing process is what courts‟ term public policy”.100 
Prior to South Africa‟s constitutional revolution public policy was determined on a 
purely objective basis.101 In other words an agreement or clause was said to be illegal if 
it was contrary to the interests of the community as a whole.102 However, in the ground 
                                                          
96
 PJ Sutherland, Ensuring contractual fairness in consumer contracts after Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) – Part 1, 
(2008) 19 Stell LR 390 at 408. 
97
 Kruger op cit note 74 at 715. 
98






 Hutchison op cit note 51 at 30. 
102
 Ibid. 
P a g e  | 21 
 
breaking decision of the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen103 the court set out a two 
stage approach to determine whether the clause at issue, a time-bar clause, was 
contrary to public policy, based on the general rubric of fairness.104 This two stage test 
has both an objective and subjective aspect.105 The Constitutional Court stated that the 
enquiry involves asking the following two questions: 
“The first is whether the clause itself is unreasonable. Secondly, if the clause is 
reasonable, whether it should be enforced in the light of the circumstances which 
prevented compliance with the …clause”106   
The first leg of this test has two parts.107 The first component implores a court to 
determine whether the clause at issue is manifestly unreasonable in that no further 
evidence is required to conclude that it is contrary to public policy108. This involves an 
objective assessment of the terms of the contract, which entails a balancing of two 
considerations: pacta sunt servanda and the right to seek judicial redress.109 The 
second component of the first leg of the test involves the objective assessment of the 
terms of the contract with reference to the circumstances of the parties.110 Ngcobo JA in 
this regard placed significant emphasis on the relative bargaining power of the parties to 
                                                          
103
 Barkhuizen supra note 36. 
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the agreement, and held that significant disparities in the relative bargaining power of 
the parties may render the terms contrary to public policy.111 
The second leg of the test is not so much concerned with the terms of the 
contract, but rather focuses on the reasonableness of enforcing the terms in the 
prevailing circumstances of the parties at the time of enforcement.112 This subjective leg 
of the test allows a party who failed to comply with a term of the contract to provide 
cogent reasons for non-compliance or to show that compliance would be unreasonable 
in the circumstances.113 
In Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd114 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that fairness is not an over-arching requirement in the law of contract.115 
Furthermore, the court narrowed down the scope of Barkhuizen by distinguishing 
Barkhuizen from Bredenkamp on the basis that the decision in Barkhuizen directly 
implicated a constitutional right.116 In the Everfresh case the Constitutional Court 
affirmed the central importance of good faith in the law of contract.117 Furthermore, the 
Court emphasised the desirability of infusing the law of contract with constitutional 
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values.118 Recently, the Constitutional Court has extended the reasoning in Barkhuizen 
in the context of exercising a right of cancellation.119  
These three decisions of the Constitutional Court have been subjected to serious 
criticisms by numerous academics120, and even the judiciary.121 The primary criticism is 
that the infusion of constitutional values, particularly fairness, has injected an intolerable 
amount of uncertainty into the South African Law of contract, and that this uncertainty 
will have dire consequences for the South African economy.122 However, in terms of the 
principle of stare decisis and the doctrine of precedence the current approach is that 
contractual terms have to pass the two-stage test as set out in Barkhuizen. 
As the foregoing has endeavoured to illustrate public policy is a broad and 
flexible concept, with no closed list of considerations that may be taken into account in 
determining whether a contractual clause is contrary to public policy. However, over the 
years the courts, both prior and after South Africa‟s constitutional revolution, have 
compiled a list of factors that may, depending on the context, be taken into account, 
referred to as the “basket” of considerations.123 
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The traditional principal consideration in the public policy analysis is pacta sunt 
servanda, which is said to be “the cornerstone of our law of contract”.124 In other words, 
the principle that agreements seriously and voluntarily entered into will be enforced is 
the starting to point of any public policy inquiry. The importance of this sacred principle 
has been given recognition to in numerous cases. In Shifren the court stated that it is a 
fundamental principle in the law of contract that contracts be enforced.125 The 
importance of this principle was also underscored by Smalberger JA in Sasfin when he 
held that power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should only be exercised 
sparingly, and only in the clearest of cases.126 In Basson it was stated that without this 
principle “all trade would be impossible”.127 In Brisley the Supreme Court of Appeal 
reaffirmed these principles in the new constitutional era by emphasising the central 
importance of commercial certainty to the economy.128 In Barkhuizen the Constitutional 
Court held that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is crucial to the conception of “self-
autonomy, or the ability to regulate one‟s own affairs, even to one‟s own detriment”129, 
and held that this “is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity”.130  
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Since the commencement of South Africa‟s new constitutional dispensation the 
Constitutional Court has given explicit recognition to the importance of principles such 
as: fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness, in the public policy inquiry.131  
The courts have also identified a plethora of principles and values that fall within 
the “basket” of considerations in the public policy inquiry.  
“These include morality; the administration of justice; the interests of the community and 
social and economic expedience; the necessity for doing simple justice between 
contracting parties; the interests of the state, or of justice, or of the public; the free 
exercise by persons of their common law rights; and the concept of Ubuntu”.132  
The relative bargaining power of the parties has also been considered in the 
public policy analysis.133 Furthermore, in the post-constitutional era the courts have 
given express recognition to the relevance of constitutional rights such as, the right to 
healthcare and the right to seek judicial redress, in the public policy analysis.134 
The current jurisprudence therefore, provides two potential bases for invalidating 
a pactum de non cedendo inter partes: Firstly, if the debtor does not have a substantial 
interest that is served by the pactum de non cedendo the clause will be invalid; 
secondly, the pactum de non cedendo may be contrary to public policy and therefore 
invalid. In this paper I will argue that the interest requirement is actually part of the 
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public policy requirement, because it is in the public interest that assets be transferable; 
hence the debtor must have a valid reason for prohibiting transfer. 
It is my contention that the interest requirement should be subsumed into the 
public policy enquiry. In other words, the interest requirement should be relegated to 
being simply another factor to be taken into account when determining whether the 
pactum de non cedendo is contrary to public policy, and should not be a free-standing 
requirement. The interest of the debtor in enforcing the pactum de non cedendo must 
be added to the “basket” of considerations in the public policy inquiry. As Van 
Huyssteen has indicated:  
“…underlying the approach of the courts to pacta de non cedendo is an assumption that 
a contractual restriction of a creditor‟s capacity to dispose of a right is contrary to public 
policy unless justified by some legitimate interest of the person in whose favour the 
restriction is imposed”.135  
This approach will allow the interests of all parties affected by the transaction to 
be considered when dealing with pacta de non cedendo.136 These interests 
include137, inter alia:  
“the interest of the debtor in maintaining the relationship with the original creditor; the 
interest of the creditor/cedent in using the claim as a financial asset; the interests of the 
actual and potential cessionaries (particularly factors and banks) in using the claim as an 
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asset in the course of their business; and the interests of the creditors of the cedent and 
cessionary, who rely on the effectiveness of the cession”.138  
Lurger contends that the interests of the debtor are relatively weak in comparison 
when contrasted with the interests of these other parties.139 Joubert shares a similar 
view, in terms of which the interest requirement should be retained, however, it should 
merely be an aspect of the broader enquiry into the lawfulness of pactum de non 
cedendo, and this enquiry would of course be dependent on considerations of public 
policy.140 
If this approach is followed it will allow courts to declare any pactum de non 
cedendo that prohibits the transferability of book debts to be declared contrary to public 
policy in light of the numerous economic benefits to society that will be gained from the 
free transferability of these rights.141 This conclusion gives effect to numerous rights in 
the Bill of Rights, and is also aligned to the values that the new Companies Act142 seeks 
to promote, most notably the promotion of small to medium sized businesses‟ economic 
growth.143 Furthermore, this approach will allow pacta de non cedendo to be given 
effect to when they do serve interests that outweigh the interests of the other parties 
affected and the broader interests of society. Example 1 above provides the 
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quintessential example of a case where the interests protected by the pactum de non 
cedendo outweigh the interests infringed by it. 
As the case history will show in the next chapter, the courts have since Paiges to 
date failed to seriously consider the public policy implications of pacta de non 
cedendo.144 As noted earlier, public policy is not a static concept, the case history 
should, therefore, not pose any hurdle in attempting to develop the law regarding the 
validity of pacta de non cedendo inter partes in the manner described above. 
(ii) Effectiveness against third parties 
This second leg of the two step approach only arises if the pactum de non cedendo 
is valid inter partes, because if it is invalid inter partes it can have no legal effect 
whatsoever.145 If the pactum de non cedendo is valid inter partes any purported cession 
would constitute a breach of contract, in terms of which the breaching party could 
potentially be liable to pay damages.146 Whether or not the breach does indeed result in 
loss will usually be dependent on whether the cession was effective.147 That raises the 
most fundamental question to this stage of the enquiry: does the pactum de non 
cedendo merely operate inter partes or does it also prevent transfer to a third party, who 
in good faith, takes cession of a right unaware of the pactum de non cedendo?148 
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It is crucial to recognise that the principles applicable to the transfer of corporeal 
property cannot be applied in relation to the transfer of incorporeal property.149 In 
respect of corporeal property only a limited real right will subtract from the owner‟s 
dominium, such as a servitude or mortgage bond.150 In other words, a third party who 
takes transfer of corporeal property in good faith, that is, in ignorance of another party‟s 
personal rights, will not be bound to give effect to that party‟s personal rights.151 
However, the pactum de non cedendo constitutes a restraint on the transferability of 
a res incorporalis, and in this context, if not in others, one cannot treat incorporeals on 
the same footing as corporeal property.152 In relation to an incorporeal personal right the 
ambit and content of the right being transferred will be determined by the actual terms of 
the contract.153  
“Every term of the contract that limits the right serves to diminish the right and 
constitutes in a sense a subtraction from the holder‟s „dominium‟ of the right. In 
accordance with the nemo plus iuris principle, the holder of the right cannot confer upon 
a third party any greater right than he himself has”.154  
Hence the oft-quoted statement by De Villiers JA in Paiges: 
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“…the cessionary only steps into the shoes of the cedent, and can have no greater 
rights than the cedent himself has. When the cedent therefore has parted with the right 
to cede the debt, no other party can obtain any rights to it”.155  
Therefore, provided the pactum de non cedendo does indeed limit the right 
concerned it will prevent a voluntary transfer to a third party, irrespective of the third 
party‟s knowledge or ignorance of the presence of the pactum de non cedendo. 
Lubbe‟s theoretical explanation of the pledge construction of a cession in 
securitatem debiti is instructive in this regard.156 Lubbe states that a right of action may 
be split into various components, for example, the right to enforce may be ceded without 
ceding the beneficial interest in the right.157 Similarly, a right of action is split when a 
valid pactum de non cedendo has been inserted into the contract by the debtor and 
creditor. In other words, once the debtor and creditor have concluded a pactum de non 
cedendo one of the components of the personal right, namely, its transferability, will 
have been removed from the personal right concerned. The creditor, therefore, will not 
have the right or capacity to transfer the right concerned, he will, however, be able to 
enforce the right personally against the debtor. Furthermore, no other party may take 
transfer of the right concerned. 
It is, therefore, clear that provided the pactum de non cedendo is valid inter 
partes, it will prevent transfer to a third party.158 This will be the case irrespective of 
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whether the pactum de non cedendo is superimposed onto a pre-existing right or is 
contained in the original agreement giving rise to the right or even if it is contained in a 
separate agreement, provided of course that the pactum de non cedendo is concluded 
by the original parties to the agreement, that is, the debtor and creditor.159  
In my opinion the current law on the validity and effect of pacta de non cedendo 
is theoretically unsound and in need of development. I am of the opinion that my 
analysis sketched out above will bring much needed clarity to this highly complex area 
of law, and that any development, in line with this analysis, will give effect to South 
Africa‟s constitutional imperatives. I believe that reform in this area of law may be 
accomplished through judicial development of the law. In my opinion judicial reform is 
mandated by section 39(2) of the Constitution; the law of cession cannot remain 
insulated from the normative effect of the objective value system encompassed in the 
Bill of Rights. One of the fundamental objectives of any development in this area of law 
must be the promotion of commerce, particularly book debt financing, which is at the 
heart of the factoring and securitisation industries.160 
In the next chapter I will trace the historical development of the legal principles 
applied to pacta de non cedendo in terms of both the case law and academic writings 
on the subject, chronologically. In the third chapter I will investigate and contrast the 
approach of other countries and institutions on the subject. And finally in the last chapter 
I will conclude with my final thoughts on the subject in light of all the preceding analysis 
and research I have conducted. 
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Chapter 2: Historical Development & Academic Commentaries 
In this chapter I will trace the historical development of the legal principles 
applicable to pacta de non cedendo in terms of the case law, as well as the views of 
academic commentators on the matter, in chronological order. I will also offer my own 
views and critiques on this development, in order to promote my own analysis on the 
topic. 
2.1 Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates Ltd 1920161 
The locus classicus and fundamental starting point to any discussion on the 
validity and effect of pacta de non cedendo must be the seminal decision of the 
Appellate Division in Paiges.  
In this case, Paiges, a general dealer, sued Van Ryn Gold Mines Ltd for wages due 
to one of its employees, one Klein, on the basis that Klein had ceded his right to wages 
to Paiges. In order to obtain groceries on credit from Paiges, Klein ceded his wages as 
security for repayment of the loan. Klein later defaulted on the loan agreement. Paiges 
then notified the company of the cession, however, the company refused to recognise 
the cession on the basis that their contract with their employee contained an 
undertaking by the employee that he would not cede his right to wages without the 
consent of the employer, as well as a provision, that any wages due would only be paid 
personally to the employee. 
i. Magistrate’s Court 
                                                          
161
 Paiges supra note 52. 
P a g e  | 33 
 
In the magistrates court judgement was given in favour of Paiges, on the basis that 
all rights of action may be ceded, and that a trader who provided credit to another on 
the strength of a security cession of the latter‟s wages could not be prejudiced by 
agreement concluded between an employee and employer which prohibited such a 
cession.162  
The magistrate in this case simply applied the legal principles applicable to corporeal 
property to incorporeal property. As articulated in Chapter 1, this reasoning fails to take 
cognisance of the nature of an incorporeal asset, in terms of which the ambit and 
content of the right transferred is determined by the terms of the agreement creating the 
right.  
ii. Transvaal Provincial Division 
On appeal the decision of the magistrate‟s court was overturned by a majority of the 
full bench of the Transvaal Provincial Division. The court held that the pactum de non 
cedendo was valid inter partes, and that in light of the fact that a cessionary cannot be 
in a better position than the cedent from whom he obtained the rights concerned, the 
pactum de non cedendo was also effective in preventing transfer to Paiges.  
(a) Public policy argument 
In relation to the argument that the pactum de non cedendo was contrary to public 
policy, the court stated the following: 
“It can hardly be seriously argued that it is illegal or immoral or against public policy for a 
workman to renounce the right to cede his wages. Employers of large numbers of 
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workmen find it a serious burden to be encumbered with cessions of wages and to be 
liable to claims put forward by persons with whom they have not contracted, and 
probably would never have contracted. All sorts of shady characters procure cessions 
and excite trouble where otherwise harmony would prevail and ought to prevail. Then if 
the employer is of a humanitarian frame of mind, he might desire to protect his workmen 
against improvidence, against moneylenders and such like who are only too ready to 
strike hard bargains and to appropriate the hard earned wages of the workman by 
obtaining cessions”.163 
The above reasoning is completely one-sided and paternalistic, and in my 
opinion, an affront to the dignity of the employee. By primarily focusing on the 
inconvenience encountered by the debtor in assessing the lawfulness of the pactum de 
non cedendo, the court fails to take cognisance of other factors relevant to the public 
policy enquiry. Employees, such as Klein, often have no other means of securing credit, 
other than by ceding their claims to wages or salary as security for their indebtedness. If 
Klein was unable to cede his right to wages how else could he obtain groceries on 
credit, and sustain his and his family‟s livelihood? The rights to life and dignity have 
been said to be the two most important rights in the constitutional era.164  
In my view the impugned provisions are contrary to public policy. On the purely 
objective first leg of the Barkhuizen test the impugned provisions fail for at least three 
reasons. Firstly, the payment of wages is completely analogous to a book debt, does it 
really make a difference who the employer pays an employee‟s wages to? In my view it 
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certainly does not. In light of technological advancements, namely, Electronic Funds 
Transfers, all that the debtor would be required to do is to substitute the employee‟s 
bank information with that of the cessionary. 
Secondly, even though it may be said that the employer is seeking to protect his 
employee from unscrupulous moneylenders this paternalistic argument loses sight of 
the fact that part of a person‟s right to dignity is the ability to regulate one‟s own affairs, 
even to one‟s own detriment. 
Thirdly, the employer certainly has superior bargaining power to that of the 
employee in negotiating an employment contract, in fact it is highly likely that no 
negotiation took place and that the employer simply gave the employee his standard 
form contract to sign. 
(b) The interest requirement 
Furthermore, the court held that the debtor (employer) in this case certainly had a 
substantial interest in concluding the pactum de non cedendo, and that it was difficult to 
see why this should not be applicable to all contracts.165 In other words, all employers 
would, in the courts view, have an interest in concluding a pactum de non cedendo. 
(c) Minority Judgment  
However, Wessels J, in his minority judgment, took an almost completely antithetical 
view, to that of the majority, to the situation.166 In his view, an incorporeal right formed 
an asset in the estate of the person to whom it is owed, that is, the creditor, and that 
                                                          
165
 Paiges supra note 52 at 604. 
166
 Ibid 606. 
P a g e  | 36 
 
such creditor may freely transfer any such right.167 Furthermore, any restraint on the 
transferability of such a right would be invalid inter partes, unless it was in favour of 
some person or persons.168 However, even if the pactum de non cedendo was valid 
between the debtor and creditor, public policy might dictate that in the circumstances 
transfer to the cessionary from the cedent should nevertheless be effective. 169 Wessels 
J stated that: 
“It seems to me that if there is a term in a contract between A and B that A will not cede 
what is due to him by B, and A in breach of this agreement cedes his right to C, C will 
acquire A‟s right against B and can enforce his claim. The arrangement that the creditor 
A must claim personally from the debtor B is not regarded as a part of the debt itself but 
as a subsidiary right. If enforceable it is at most a right for which damages may be 
claimed”.170 
It appears that Wessels J was of the view that a pactum de non cedendo could 
be valid inter partes and ineffective against a third party/cessionary, simultaneously.171 If 
the pactum de non cedendo was held to be effective against third parties it would 
deprive an employee of the capacity to obtain credit facilities on the strength of a 
security cession of his wages, and oblige such an employee to obtain credit from his 
employer, often at an exorbitant rate.172 Whether the employer paid the employee 
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personally, or his agent, or even a cessionary, would not make any substantial 
difference to the employer.173 
Wessels J, therefore, applied the public policy enquiry in order to determine both the 
validity of the pactum de non cedendo inter partes, and its effect on transfer. 
iii.  Appellate Division 
In the Appellate Division Paiges appeal against the decision of the court a quo was 
dismissed with costs. The court in this case had to determine two fundamental issues: 
first, the court had to determine whether or not the pactum de non cedendo was valid 
inter partes; and secondly, if the agreement was valid inter partes, whether it had the 
effect of preventing transfer of the rights concerned to a purported cessionary.  
De Villiers JA, who wrote the unanimous judgement of the court, stated that the 
general principle in our law was that all personal rights could be freely ceded, 
irrespective of the will of the debtor, and that this principle was equally applicable to an 
employee who ceded his right to wages against his employer to a third party.174 
However, one of the contentious issues in this case was whether the parties could 
render such rights incapable of cession by agreement.175 In other words, the court had 
to ascertain whether there was any principle in law that could limit the principle of 
freedom of contract in this case.176  
i. The interest requirement 
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In this regard, De Villiers JA placed strong reliance on the writings of Sande177 and 
Voet178, in terms of which agreements restricting an owner‟s right to freely dispose of his 
property were held to be invalid and of no force and effect, where the person imposing 
the restriction had no interest in the stipulation.179 However, this principle was only 
applicable where the debtor did not have an interest in the restriction, therefore “if the 
stipulation can be shown to serve a useful purpose to the debtor, it is valid and binding 
upon the parties to the contract”.180 In the Court‟s view it was axiomatic that an 
employer of a large number of employees had a “very real interest” that was served by 
the restriction.181 In light of the fact that an employer could be called upon to pay an 
employee‟s wages to a myriad of people, which could cause numerous complications, 
such an employer had a very real interest in seeking to avoid such situations by means 
of a pactum de non cedendo.182 
 
ii. Public policy 
In response to the argument that the impugned provision was contrary to public 
policy in light of the fact that it placed an employee seeking an advance at the mercy of 
his employer, De Villiers JA acknowledged that there was merit in this argument, but 
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also pointed out that the clause in issue might in fact work to the advantage of the 
employee, as stated by Curlewis JA in South African Railways183.184 The conclusive 
answer to the public policy argument, in De Villiers JA‟s view, was that the possible 
detriment to the employee was insufficient for the court to declare the impugned 
provision contra bonos mores, and deferred to the Legislature to decide whether the 
impugned provision was contrary to public policy.185 
De Villiers JA‟s application of the public policy enquiry was essentially synonymous 
with that of the majority in the court a quo.186 The criticisms levelled against the 
reasoning of the majority in the court a quo, therefore, apply with equal force to this 
aspect of De Villiers JA‟s judgment. 
iii. Effectiveness against third parties 
The final argument that the court had to deal with was that a trader who extended 
credit to another, on the strength of the common law principle that rights are freely 
transferable, should not be prejudiced by an agreement to which he was not privy , and 
of which he had no knowledge . De Villiers JA stated that this argument overlooked the 
fact that the cessionary merely steps into the shoes of the cedent and could have no 
greater rights than the cedent himself had.187  
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“When the cedent therefore has parted with the right to cede the debt, no other party can 
obtain any rights to it. The right which the creditor obtains, being circumscribed by the 
terms of his agreement with the debtor, becomes by agreement between the parties a 
strictly personal right, and cannot be ceded.”188  
In relation to corporeal property a contractual restriction on alienation cannot 
prevent transfer of the property. Even though a personal right is an incorporeal asset, 
the analogous reasoning cannot be extended to incorporeal property due to the nature 
of the right being transferred.189 As stated by Windscheid190 “The stipulation against 
cession is part and parcel of the agreement creating the right, and the right is limited by 
the stipulation”.191 
Over the next 48 years the law as stated in Paiges was essentially applied 
indiscriminately by the courts.192 However, in 1968 the judgment of the Appellate 
Division in Trust Bank193 elicited fierce debate when the court appeared to suggest that 
the interest requirement had only limited application.194 
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2.2 Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
This case concerned certain deposit vouchers that were issued by Trust Bank to 
one of its customer‟s, Mrs. Davidoff. On eight occasions Mrs. Davidoff made deposits 
with Trust Bank and on each occasion she was issued with a deposit voucher. All of 
these deposit vouchers contained a clause stating that the deposit voucher was issued 
subject to the conditions endorsed overleaf.195 Condition one stated that the deposit 
voucher was “neither transferable nor negotiable”.196 
Mrs. Davidoff subsequently became indebted to Trust Bank and agreed to repay 
her debt in monthly instalments. In order to secure her indebtedness she pledged and 
delivered all eight deposit vouchers, in terms of a security cession, to Trust Bank. 
Sometime later all eight deposit vouchers were released back to Mrs. Davidoff 
unendorsed.  
Subsequently, Mrs Davidoff approached Standard Bank, in her capacity as 
director of Chermedine Clothing Corporation (Pty) Ltd, in order to obtain certain credit 
facilities. Standard Bank agreed to extend credit to the company, and in order to secure 
repayment Mrs. Davidoff once again pledged the same eight deposit vouchers to 
Standard Bank in terms of a security cession. Standard Bank was unaware, at all 
material times that the eight deposit vouchers were previously pledged to Trust Bank, in 
terms of a prior security cession. 
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Standard Bank successfully sued Trust Bank in the Transvaal Provincial Division 
for a declaration that it was entitled, on presentation of the eight deposit vouchers, to 
receive payment of various amounts aggregating R3 400 in total. It is important to note 
that Hill J did not even consider Trust Bank‟s argument that condition one constituted a 
pactum de non cedendo.197 
(a) Minority Judgment 
The minority judgment, delivered by Ogilvie Thompson JA, considered the 
possibility that condition one constituted a pactum de non cedendo. He stated that 
generally all rights of action may be ceded, unless cession is restricted by the parties to 
the contract198, and on the authority of Paiges stated that a pactum de non cedendo 
may be enforced in certain circumstances. However, due to the restrictive nature of 
such a clause it would only be appropriate to enforce such a clause if it was expressed 
in “clear and unequivocal terms”.199 
Ogilvie Thompson JA concluded that condition one did not amount to a pactum 
de non cedendo as it was not phrased in clear and unequivocal language, and that, 
therefore, it did not invalidate the security cession of the deposit vouchers to Standard 
Bank.200 This conclusion was premised on the following two reasons: firstly, if Trust 
Bank genuinely intended condition one to amount to a pactum de non cedendo it should 
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have expressed its intention in more explicit language so that this intention could be 
conveyed.201 
Secondly, the fact that condition one only referred to the „deposit voucher‟ meant 
that the document itself was „neither transferable nor negotiable‟, but did not entail that 
the rights recorded therein were „neither transferable nor negotiable‟, and therefore, it 
could not be concluded that condition one prevented conferral of title of these rights to 
Standard Bank. Although Ogilvie Thompson JA was not explicit on this point, the clear 
implication was that the rights contained in the deposit voucher could be ceded, and 
that therefore, title was conferred onto Standard Bank to enforce these rights against 
Trust Bank.202 
(b) Majority Judgment 
However, the majority judgment, written by Botha JA, upheld Trust Bank‟s appeal 
on the basis that condition one did in fact amount to a pactum de non cedendo, which 
provided Trust Bank with a complete defence against Standard Bank‟s claim.203 
Botha JA reached this conclusion by establishing from the outset that Mrs. 
Davidoff ceded the deposit vouchers to Standard Bank in terms of a cession in 
securitatem debiti, and that the only question that remained was the validity of these 
security cessions in light of the fact that the deposit vouchers were issued on condition 
that they were „neither transferable nor negotiable‟.204 
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On the authority of Paiges, Botha JA stated the law in this regard to be the 
following: 
“The rule of our law is that all rights in personam, subject to certain exceptions based 
primarily upon the personal nature of the rights, not here relevant, can be freely ceded, 
but an owner‟s rights of free disposal of his property may be restricted by a pactum de 
non cedendo. The effect of such a pactum depends upon the circumstances. Voet 
2.14.20 and Sande, Restraints, 4.1.1 and 4.2.1, point out that an agreement whereby an 
owner deprives himself of the free right to deal with his own property, is without effect 
unless the other contracting party has an interest in the restriction, and Windscheid, 
Pandektenrechts, 8th ed, p 358, note 5, refers to the fact relied upon by Seuffert that also 
in the case of corporeals a contractual prohibition against alienation does not render the 
alienation void. These principles do not, however, apply where the right is created with a 
restriction against alienation, and the restriction is contained in the very agreement 
recording the right, for in such a case the right itself is limited by the stipulation against 
alienation and can be relied upon by the debtor for whose benefit the stipulation was 
made”.205 [My emphasis] 
In application of the law to the present matter Botha JA held that condition one 
did indeed amount to a valid pactum de non cedendo, as Trust Bank, for whose benefit 
the stipulation had been inserted, had a clear interest that was served by the 
prohibition.206 Therefore, Trust bank was entitled to rely on condition one as a complete 
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defence against any cause of action brought by a purported cessionary, such as 
Standard Bank.207 
The above quoted passage appears to create the impression that when a right is 
born with a restriction on transfer, that is, the agreement creating the right also contains 
a pactum de non cedendo, the pactum de non cedendo would be valid irrespective of 
whether the debtor is able to prove an interest in the prohibition.208 In other words, there 
is no interest requirement, which must be proven by the debtor in these circumstances. 
In my view this apparent impression is untenable for two reasons. Firstly, Botha 
JA cites Paiges as authority for his above exposition of the law.209 The ratio in Paiges is 
that a debtor must always prove an interest that is served by the restriction in order for 
the pactum de non cedendo to be valid.210 
Secondly, in concluding that condition one did constitute a pactum de non 
cedendo, Botha JA stated that Trust Bank in any event had a clear interest in the 
prohibition.211 Therefore, Botha JA‟s view that the debtor is not required to prove an 
interest in the pactum de non cedendo when the right is created with a restriction on 
transfer, was merely obiter dictum, and did not form part of the ratio decidendi of the 
decision, as Sunkel212 contends.213 
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In relation to the argument that condition one only related to the document itself 
and not the rights contained therein, as Ogilvie Thompson concluded, Botha JA 
respectfully disagreed. Botha JA held that condition one not only prevented transfer of 
the document itself but also the rights contained therein.214 In his view, to conclude that 
condition one only prevented transfer of the document itself would undermine and 
frustrate the very rationale of including condition one in the first place, which was to 
prevent transfer of the rights contained in the deposit vouchers.215 The only mechanism 
in law in terms of which these rights could be transferred was by way of cession, and 
the reason Trust Bank included condition one was to prevent such transfer, therefore, in 
terms of the ordinary and literal meaning of condition one Mrs. Davidoff was precluded 
from ceding the deposit vouchers in securitatem debiti to Standard Bank.216 
 
2.3 Italtrafo SpA v Electricity Supply Commission217 
In this case Escom successfully applied for an attachment ad fundandam 
jurisdictionem of a personal right which Italtrafo had against Escom. Subsequently, 
Italtrafo sought to set aside the attachment order on the basis that at the time of 
attachment the personal right concerned did not form part of their estate, as it had 
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previously ceded the personal right concerned to Bank of Naples, in terms of a cession 
in securitatem debiti. 
Escom, however, contended that the cession in securitatem debiti to Bank of 
Naples was ineffective and of no force and effect, due to presence of a pactum de non 
cedendo in the contract between Escom and Italtrafo in terms of which: 
“… [Italtrafo] shall not assign or make over the contract or any part thereof or any share 
or interest therein to any other person without the written consent of Escom which may 
be refused without any reason being given”.218 
Escom categorically denied that it had consented to the security cession of the 
personal rights from Italtrafo to Bank of Naples, and that therefore, the security cession 
was invalid. 
King AJ presided over the matter, and summarised the ratio in Paiges in the 
following terms: 
“…[S]uch a restraint will be enforced against a party claiming to be a cessionary if the 
debtor had a material and reasonable interest in making the stipulation”.219 
In application to the facts of the case King AJ pointed out that because Escom 
employed the services of skilled manufacturers in the production of large pieces of 
equipment that it required in order to produce its own goods and services, it would 
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cause Escom great loss if these pieces of equipment were defective.220 This led King AJ 
to conclude that Escom did have a material and reasonable interest in the stipulation.221 
Relying on the decision in Trust Bank, King AJ stated the following: 
“…[W]here the restriction against the transfer of the rights formed part of the contract in 
question, the person claiming to be the cessionary could not acquire the cedent‟s rights 
without the debtor‟s consent. Any rights obtained by the person claiming to be the 
cessionary would be subject to such a restraint”.222 
It is interesting to note that in King AJ‟s view “[t]he Appellate Division seems to 
have departed from the test of material and reasonable interest laid down in Paiges‟ 
case”, in its decision in Trust Bank.223 In reaching this conclusion King AJ relied, inter 
alia, on the following sentence from the judgment of Botha JA in Trust Bank: 
“These principles do not, however, apply where the right is created with a restriction 
against alienation, and the restriction is contained in the very agreement recording the 
right, for in such a case the right itself is limited by the stipulation against alienation and 
can be relied upon by the debtor for whose benefit the stipulation was made”.224 
                                                          
220




 Ibid 710H-711A. 
223
 Ibid 711A. 
224
 Ibid. 
P a g e  | 49 
 
In my view, King‟s AJ interpretation of the Trust Bank case is unwarranted, for 
the reasons stated above.225 Relying on his own interpretation of the decision in Trust 
Bank King AJ came to the following conclusion: 
“As I have already found as a matter of probability that the restraint against cession 
formed part of the contract in respect of the transformer…the cession is not a valid 
one”.226 
Approximately two years after the decision in Italtrafo a full bench of Transvaal 
Provincial Division had an opportunity to express its views on the doctrine of pacta de 
non cedendo in Vawda.227 
 2.4 Vawda v Vawda and others 
This case concerned the sale of immoveable property, which was sold by the 
Community Development Board to Mr. Vawda. The parties agreed that the purchase 
price was to be paid off in monthly instalments. In terms of clause 11 of their agreement 
the purchaser was obliged to obtain the consent of the seller prior to ceding his rights 
under the agreement.228 
After conclusion of the sale both Mr. and Mrs. Vawda took occupation of the 
property. Furthermore, Mrs. Vawda paid some of the monthly instalments on the 
property. Subsequently, Mr and Mrs. Vawda experienced matrimonial difficulties, and 
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Mrs. Vawda became aware that her husband was attempting to sell the property in 
order to finance his emigration. 
In order to prevent the sale of the property Mrs Vawda paid Mr. Vawda R 2000 in 
exchange for him agreeing to cede all his rights and interests in the property to her. 
Despite ceding all his rights and interests in the property to Mrs. Vawda, Mr. Vawda 
nevertheless sold the property to a third party. 
The present matter arose when Mrs. Vawda attempted to interdict the transfer of 
the property to the third party upon becoming aware of the sale agreement. 
In the court a quo Mrs. Vawda‟s application was dismissed by Nicholas J on the 
basis that the cession to Mrs. Vawda was invalid.229 Mrs Vawda‟s subsequent appeal to 
a full bench of the Transvaal Provincial Division was dismissed by the unanimous 
judgment of Boshoff AJP. 
Mrs Vawda contended, inter alia, that clause 11 constituted an invalid pactum de 
non cedendo and was therefore ineffective.230 This was because, so the argument ran, 
the validity of the pactum de non cedendo depended upon whether the restriction could 
be shown to serve a „useful purpose‟ to the debtor.231  
Furthermore, Mrs. Vawda contended that the onus of proving the existence of 
such an interest rested on the person seeking to enforce the restraint.232 Relying on the 
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decision in Du Plessis233, so the argument ran, the court was entitled to look at the 
contract itself in order to determine whether or not such an interest existed.234 In Mrs. 
Vawda‟s view, a careful examination of the contract clearly demonstrated that no such 
interest could be shown to exist by the Community Development Board.235 
The final leg of this argument was that the party required to demonstrate an 
interest in the stipulation in this case was the Community Development Board, and 
because the Community Development Board had made no attempt to demonstrate an 
interest in the restriction, there was no interest present as required. Therefore, the 
pactum de non cedendo was invalid and ineffective.236 
Boshoff AJP‟s point of departure to Mrs Vawda‟s arguments was that in terms of 
decision in Paiges the entire sale agreement had to be considered in order to ascertain 
the extent of Mr. Vawda‟s rights thereunder.237 
Although Boshoff AJP accepted the correctness of Mrs. Vawda‟s arguments in 
relation to the interest requirement, he pointed out that the defect contained therein was 
that she considered the pactum de non cedendo to be a separate agreement from that 
of the sale agreement, when in fact, the pactum de non cedendo was “part and parcel of 
the agreement creating the right, and the right is limited by the stipulation”238.239 
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Furthermore, Boshoff AJP stated that apart from the interest requirement, one should 
also take cognisance of the contents of 4 1 1, 4 1 6 and 4 1 7 in Sande‟s De 
Prohibita.240 Boshoff AJP subsequently stated that Botha JA in Trust Bank: 
“[r]ecognised this difference and did not depart from the test of material and reasonable 
interest laid down in Paiges’ case as suggested by King AJ in Italtrafo”.241   
In light of the above Boshoff AJP concluded that clause 11 did in fact constitute a 
valid pactum de non cedendo which prevented cession of Mr. Vawda‟s rights to Mrs. 
Vawda. Therefore, the purported cession to Mrs. Vawda was invalid and unenforceable. 
Most notably Boshoff AJP explicitly rejected King AJ‟s suggestion that the decision in 
Trust Bank amounted to a departure from the ratio in Paiges. This view appeared to be 
confirmed by the Appellate Division in the case of MTK Saagmeule (Pty) Ltd v Killyman 
Estates (Pty) Ltd242 when it re-stated the interest requirement.243 
 
2.5 MTK Saagmeule (Pty) Ltd v Killyman Estates (Pty) Ltd 
The plaintiff in this case, Killyman Estates, was awarded a tender by the 
Department of Forestry, and in 1973 the parties concluded an agreement in terms of 
which Killyman Estates would harvest and remove certain standing timber located on 
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two farms, against payment of the price to the Department. Clause 27 of their 
agreement contained a pactum de non cedendo and stated that: “The purchaser 
(Killyman Estates) shall not cede, transfer or assign his rights under the contract without 
the written consent of the seller (Department of Forestry)”. 
However, in 1974 Killyman Estates entered into an agreement with the 
defendant, MTK Saagmeule, in terms of clause 3 of their agreement Killyman 
apparently agreed, inter alia, to assign all rights, obligations and liabilities under its 
contract with the Department, to MTK Saagmeule. It was common cause that the 
Department had not consented to the purported cession. Clause 5 of their agreement, 
however, stated that Killyman Estates: 
“undertakes to make the payments to the Department of Forestry as the timber is sawn 
and in terms of the contract. The said Saagmeule undertake hereby to saw and remove 
the timber strictly in terms of the contract which is known to them and of which they have 
a copy”. 
Furthermore, in terms of clause 7 of their agreement MTK Saagmeule declared 
that they “had properly read through” the agreement concluded between Killyman 
Estates and the Department of Forestry, and that they “fully understood their 
responsibility”. 
Subsequently, MTK Saagmeule fell behind schedule in harvesting and removing 
the wood. The plaintiff thereafter instituted action against the defendant for breach of 
contract and claimed R 29 500 with interest.  
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In the court a quo the following issues arose for determination:244 Firstly, whether 
on a proper interpretation of the agreement concluded between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, the plaintiff was obliged to substitute the defendant for the plaintiff in terms of 
their agreement concluded with the Department? Secondly, whether or not the  
agreement concluded between the plaintiff and defendant was valid and enforceable in 
law in light of the fact that the Department had not consented thereto? Thirdly, whether 
the defendant was obliged to pay the purchase price to the plaintiff prior to the plaintiff 
performing in terms of the agreement? The final issue was whether or not the defendant 
was entitled to cancel their agreement with the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff 
had failed to perform? 
In the court a quo judgment on all four issues was given in favour of the 
plaintiff.245 The court held that the agreement concluded between Killyman and MTK 
Saagmeule was valid and enforceable as the parties did not intend a full substitution.246 
On appeal in the Appellate Division MTK Saagmeule contended that the intention 
of the parties was to effect a cession of the rights concerned, and in light of the fact that 
the Department did not consent to the transfer, the agreement concluded between 
Killyman and MTK Saagmeule was void.247 
MTK Saagmeule argued further that in the present matter clause 27 of the 
agreement concluded between Killyman and the Department constituted a pactum de 
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non cedendo that had the effect of rendering any cession concluded without the written 
consent of the debtor invalid.248  
Rumpff CJ, who wrote the unanimous judgment of the court, rejected MTK 
Saagmeule‟s pactum de non cedendo argument.249 Rumpff CJ stated that in the present 
matter the doctrine of pacta de non cedendo was inapplicable, and that MTK 
Saagmeule‟s reliance thereon was misplaced.250  
Rumpff CJ held that there was no common intention by the parties (that is, the 
plaintiff and the defendant) to effect a substitution or a cession, in spite of clause 3 of 
their agreement.251 In other words, it was not the intention of the parties that MTK 
Saagmeule would substitute Killyman in the contract between Killyman and the 
Department. Furthermore, the parties did not intend that Killyman‟s rights under their 
agreement with the Department would be ceded to MTK Saagmeule. The Court held 
that when a provision in a contract is ambiguous a court may take cognisance of other 
provisions in the agreement, and that the court may draw inferences from the proven 
facts in order to ascertain how the parties interpreted their agreement.252  
Rumpff CJ acknowledged that in general a court is not entitled to interpret a 
document by taking account of the conduct of the parties.253 However, he held that 
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when there is ambiguity a court may attempt to ascertain the real intention of the parties 
by taking cognisance of other provisions in the contract as well as evidence indicating 
how the parties to the contract understood their agreement.254 
Rumpff CJ held that in the present matter the parties did not intend to effect a 
cession or substitution for the following reasons:255 Firstly, clause 7 of their agreement 
indicated that the defendant was well aware that the Department would only recognise a 
transfer if it had consented to such transfer. Secondly, the defendant had never insisted 
upon such consent, this together with the contents of clause 5 of their agreement, must 
lead one to infer that the defendant did not intend to replace the plaintiff. Thirdly, 
subsequent to the agreement concluded between the plaintiff and the defendant, the 
plaintiff continued to conduct itself as though it was still a party to the contract with the 
Department, and that this was in conflict with an intention that the defendant would 
substitute the plaintiff in their agreement with the Department.  
Finally, Rumpff CJ held that:  
“having regard to the other provisions of the contract and to how the parties themselves 
had interpreted the contract, that it had to be found that the parties had not intended 
what had apparently been provided in clause 3, namely that a transfer should take place 
and that defendant should take the place of plaintiff; the parties had only intended to give 
the defendant the opportunity of exercising the rights of the plaintiff, against payment of 
a specified amount, and these rights would be exercised strictly according to the terms 
of the contract between plaintiff and the Department.” 
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Rumpff CJ held that the agreement concluded between the plaintiff and the 
defendant was, therefore, valid in law, and that the plaintiff was entitled to rely 
thereon.256 Furthermore, he held that the plaintiff had not failed to perform, and that the 
defendant had breached their contract.257 The appeal was, therefore, dismissed.258 
The cumulative effect of Rumpff CJ‟s judgment was that Killyman would remain 
party to the contract with the Department and would then have a back to back 
agreement with MTK Saagmeule. Therefore, their agreement with the defendant would 
not fall foul of the pactum de non cedendo contained in clause 27 of their contract with 
the Department.  
Interestingly, even though Rumpff CJ ruled out the application of the doctrine of 
pacta de non cedendo he did offer valuable obiter dictum when he re-stated the interest 
requirement. In this regard Rumpff CJ stated the following: in discussing Paiges case he 
held that, “Legally it was clear that when the original debtor had „an interest‟ in the 
prohibition on transfer, the prohibition is valid in respect of the debtor concerned.”259 
Furthermore, he stated that, “Because such a pactum infringes the owner‟s right of 
control over his property, it is regarded as valid only if it is to the advantage or in the 
interest of the other contracting party.”260 
These statements are clearly commensurate with the view of Boshoff AJP in 
Vawda. In other words, even if a right is born ab initio with a restriction on transfer the 
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pactum de non cedendo will only be accorded validity if the debtor is able to 
demonstrate an interest. 
 
2.6 Joubert’s Solution 
In 1985 Joubert proposed his own solution to the controversial interest 
requirement in his doctoral thesis. In his view the inquiry into validity of pacta de non 
cedendo inter partes does not involve, contrary to Scott‟s assertion261, a choice between 
freedom of contract on the one hand, and freedom of trade on the other.262 Joubert 
argues that these values may be reconciled.263 He proposed the following approach: 
“Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat dit nie nodig is om met besondere reels te werk 
waarmee die geldigheid van pacta de non cedendo beordeel moet word nie. Al wat 
nodig is, is om aan die hand van die normale geldigheidsvereistes vir „n kontrak vas te 
stel of „n pactum de non cedendo geldig is. Veral die geoorloofheidsvereiste kom in 
hierdie verband ter sprake. In die Suid-Afrikaanse reg is „n kontrak onder andere 
ongeoorloofd indien dit in stryd met die openbare belang is”.264 
In his view it is not necessary to adopt either a law of obligations or law of 
property approach, to determine the validity of pacta de non cedendo, since he 
contends that pacta de non cedendo should not be assessed in terms of the interest 
requirement. Instead, he argues that the validity of pacta de non cedendo should be 
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determined by the general requirements for contractual validity.265 One such 
requirement is that a contract should be lawful, whether or not a contract is unlawful is 
ascertained by conducting a public policy inquiry.266 In other words, Joubert‟s contention 
is that the freedoms of contract and trade may be reconciled in the public policy inquiry. 
In order to illustrate his approach Joubert relies on the decision in Magna Alloys 
and Research SA (Pty) Ltd v Ellis.267 This case concerned a restraint of trade 
agreement, in contrast to a pactum de non cedendo. The court in this case held that a 
restraint of trade clause is prima facie valid, unless it could be shown that the clause 
was contrary to public policy, and that an unreasonable restraint of trade clause would 
be contrary to public policy.268 In other words, if the restraint of trade clause could be 
shown to be unreasonable it would be contrary to public policy, and as such invalid and 
unenforceable. Furthermore, Joubert states that an indication of the unreasonableness 
of such a clause would be where the person in whose favour the restraint had been 
inserted had no interest that was served by the clause.269 
In Joubert‟s view the decision in Magna Alloys mandates an approach, 
analogous to that of restraint of trade clauses, to determine the validity of pacta de non 
cedendo. In other words, if the person in whose favour the pactum de non cedendo has 
been inserted is able to demonstrate an interest in the prohibition the pactum de non 
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cedendo would be reasonable, this factor would, therefore, favour upholding the 
lawfulness and enforceability of the pactum de non cedendo.270  
I, however, share Lubbe and Murrays‟ scepticism that restraint of trade clauses 
are not sufficiently akin to pacta de non cedendo to warrant an analogous approach.271 
Sunkel, however, endorses Joubert‟s approach and states that: 
“I believe that the two constructions are sufficiently similar to justify a comparison and as 
Joubert has pointed out, a restraint of a trade clause and a pactum de non cedendo are 
both restraints voluntarily agreed to by parties in the commercial arena”.272 
Sunkel, however, concedes that Joubert‟s association of the reasonableness 
criterion in the determination of the validity of pacta de non cedendo is problematic 
since this factor has not been used by the courts.273 I too agree, as Sunkel274 does, with 
Roussouw‟s criticism that the fundamental problem with Joubert‟s approach is that he 
attempts to encompass the assessment of pacta de non cedendo under the umbrella of 
the decision in Magna Alloys.275 
In my view Joubert‟s general proposition that the interest requirement should be 
subsumed into the public policy enquiry in order to determine the lawfulness and validity 
pacta de non cedendo is sound. Reasonableness is certainly a factor that may be taken 
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into account in the public policy enquiry. However, in my opinion one should not apply 
the specific test to determine the reasonableness of a restraint of trade when 
determining the overall lawfulness of a pactum de non cedendo. I, therefore, reject 
Joubert‟s assertion that an analogous approach to that taken in determining the 
lawfulness of a restraint of trade clause is warranted in relation to determining the 
lawfulness of a pactum de non cedendo. 
 
2.7 Roussouw’s Solution 
Roussouw argues, as Lubbe and Murray do, that the interest requirement unduly 
fetters freedom of contract, which is undeniably the cornerstone of the South African law 
of contact.276 Roussouw contrasts the approach to pacta de non cedendo to the 
approach taken to limitations on the alienation of rights in the law of things. He points 
out that in the context of the law of things both real rights and personal rights may limit 
an owner‟s right to alienate his property.277 To fortify this proposition Roussouw lists the 
following examples: an option, a right of pre-emption, a restraint on alienation and, a 
fideicommissum.278 
Roussouw argues that these types of restrictive personal rights are completely 
valid and binding, and that some may be even be perceived of as an encumbrance on 
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immoveable property, and may be registered as real rights.279 In my opinion, even 
though personal rights may be registered in terms of the Deeds Registries Act280, 
registration does not transform the personal right into a real right.281 
I am, however, in complete agreement with Roussouw‟s contention that in light of 
the fact that these types of restrictive personal rights are automatically valid, without a 
need to prove an interest in the restriction, there is no reason why pacta de non 
cedendo should not also be valid without the need to prove an interest.282 
Roussouw makes an excellent point. Contractants who conclude these other 
types of restrictive agreements are not required to prove an interest in the prohibition in 
order for the prohibition to be valid and binding, why then are debtors‟ required to prove 
an interest in the pactum de non cedendo, even though both parties have agreed to 
insert the term, in order for such an agreement to be valid?283  
Provided the contract is valid in every other respect a pactum non cedendo 
should be valid, irrespective of whether or not the debtor is able to prove an interest in 
the prohibition.284 However, whether there is such an interest is not irrelevant; it is one 
aspect of the public policy enquiry. In my opinion, such an approach to the validity of 
pacta de non cedendo is mandated by s 39(2) of the Constitution. In my view, the rule 
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that a debtor must prove an interest in a pactum de non cedendo in order for such an 
agreement to be valid, falls short of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Equality is one of the most important values encompassed in the Constitution, this value 
will be promoted by demoting the interest requirement to simply being another factor to 
be taken into account in the public policy analysis, and not a free-standing requirement. 
However, the proposition that the interest requirement unduly fetters freedom of 
contract is not supported by all academics. Welsh, for one, points out that in certain 
circumstances an interest may be gleaned from the contract itself, obviating the need 
for the debtor to prove an interest, as occurred in Du Plessis285.286 Welsh states that 
such a conclusion leads one to question whether freedom of contract is actually 
fettered, given the limited practical utility of the interest requirement in these 
circumstances.287  
De Wet and Van Wyk argue that in light of the broad and vague meaning 
ascribed to the interest requirement in Paiges, and the fact that it is surely in the 
debtor‟s interest to know the identity of his creditor, any intrusion, if any, on the principle 
of freedom of contract is negligible.288 In fact De Wet and Van Wyk argue that the 
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interest requirement is superfluous given the ease with which a debtor may be prove an 
interest in the stipulation.289  
Roussouw‟s solution to this dilemma is to jettison the interest requirement 
altogether, and to assess the validity of pacta de non cedendo in terms of the general 
public policy approach.290 In terms of this approach the central question to be answered 
is whether freedom of contract or freedom of trade should be favoured in any given 
case. It is clear that Roussouw‟s approach was influenced by Joubert‟s approach, but 
unlike Joubert, Roussouw does not confine the public policy enquiry to the approach 
adopted in Magna Alloys, he instead prefers to assess the validity of pacta de non 
cedendo against the approach adopted in general when conducting the public policy 
enquiry.291 Furthermore, Roussouw asserts that by only judging pacta de non cedendo 
against a single element may increase certainty.292 
In my view, it would be unwise to jettison the interest requirement altogether, 
instead the interest requirement should be subsumed and relegated to being simply 
another factor to be taken into account when conducting the public policy analysis. In 
my opinion the futility of the interest requirement has been exaggerated by many of the 
academics.  
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It must, however, be acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Smuts v 
Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en ‘n ander v Booyens293 appeared to accept De Wet 
and Van Wyk‟s assertion that the debtor will always have an interest in knowing the 
identity of its creditor.294 
 
2.8 Scott’s solution (1991) 
Scott, like King AJ in Italtrafo, interpreted the majority judgment of Botha JA in 
Trust Bank as an express departure from the law as previously stated in Paiges.295 In 
her view, the interest requirement was not universally applicable, and only applied when 
a pactum de non cedendo was superimposed onto a pre-existing right, it was not, 
however, applicable when the right was born ab initio with a restriction on transfer.296 
Scott expressed her view in the following terms: 
“To my mind the present position in South African law at the moment in regard to pacta 
de non cedendo is as follows: an agreement restricting the cedability of existing rights is 
invalid unless the restriction is in the interest of the person in whose favour it has been 
made. If the restricting agreement is part and parcel of the agreement creating the right, 
such an agreement is also valid, even if the cedent has no interest in the restraint. In 
both cases, however, the effect of the pactum de non cedendo is that a cession contrary 
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to the restraint is of no force or effect and does not result [only]297 in a claim for 
damages. 
The correct approach should be the following: a clear distinction should be drawn 
between a pactum de non cedendo in relation to existing rights, and one in relation to a 
right which is created as a non-transferable right. In relation to existing rights, the views 
of Sande and Voet should be followed in regard to both the validity and the effect of a 
pactum de non cedendo. In other words, as such an agreement is contrary to the basic 
principle of the law of property that a res in commercio should not be withdrawn from 
commercial dealings, a good reason is required, or, as the courts interpret it, the person 
in whose favour the restraint is operating should have an interest in the agreement. The 
effect of such an agreement is that it is binding only on the parties to the agreement and 
a breach thereof results in a claim for damages the right, however, passes to the 
cessionary. 
 
In relation to a right which is created as a non-transferable right, a pactum de non 
cedendo is valid as the principle of freedom of contract is paramount here and therefore 
the requirement that the debtor should have an interest in the agreement is 
unnecessary. A cession contrary to such an agreement is of no force and effect even in 
the event of involuntary cessions, as the nature of the right is such that it is not 
transferable.”298 
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Scott‟s reliance on the decision in Trust Bank, as authority for her view, that there 
are two constructions of pacta de non cedendo, in terms of which different rules are 
applicable, is in my view, fundamentally flawed for the reasons stated above.299 Van 
Huyssteen et al point out that the cumulative effect of Scott‟s proposed solution is that 
the interest requirement will almost completely disappear, as the vast majority of pacta 
de non cedendo are inserted at the time of conclusion of a contract.300 
In my opinion Scott‟s proposed solution, is with all due respect, illogical, for the following 
reasons: 
Scott states that in relation to pre-existing rights in terms of which a pactum de 
non cedendo is super-imposed onto the debtor must prove an interest in order for such 
an agreement to be valid inter partes, however, even if the debtor is able to prove an 
interest the pactum de non cedendo would not prevent transfer of the right to a third 
party due to the operation of the fundamental principle in property law that a res in 
commercio should not be withdrawn from commerce. The debtor will, however, be able 
to sue the cedent for breach of contract in these circumstances. 
Scott states that an example of a pactum de non cedendo that is superimposed 
onto a pre-existing right is where the right concerned is created without a restriction on 
transfer but the cedent and cessionary agree that the cessionary will not transfer the 
ceded right further.301 Although I agree with Scott‟s views as to the effect of such an 
agreement, I categorically deny the validity of her reasons for this conclusion. The 
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reason why transfer will not be prevented in these circumstances is because only the 
debtor and creditor to the agreement creating the right may validly remove the element 
of transferability from the rights concerned, and not because, as Scott contends, of the 
operation of the principle that a res in commercio should not be removed from 
commerce.302 In other words, only the debtor and creditor to the agreement may validly 
remove the element of transmissibility from the rights concerned in these 
circumstances.303 Therefore, if the cedent and cessionary agree to insert a pactum de 
non cedendo such a prohibition is insufficient to prevent transfer of the right from the 
cessionary to a third party, as the cedent and cessionary are not able to remove the 
element of transmissibility, only the original debtor and creditor may do so. 
 
A further reason to doubt the operation of the property principle is that if the 
underlying rationale of this principle is that a restraint would unduly impede the free flow 
of commerce in these circumstances, logically, as Lubbe points out, this principle should 
apply to both constructions of pacta de non cedendo identified by Scott.304  
Furthermore, Scott‟s proposal appears to encompass the following situation within the 
category of pre-existing rights onto which a pactum de non cedendo is superimposed: 
where the debtor and creditor create a right that is born without a restriction on transfer, 
but subsequently agree to insert a pactum de non cedendo. If this scenario is indeed 
what Scott had in mind as falling within her pre-existing right construction, then her 
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conclusion that the cedent will not be prevented from effecting transfer to the cessionary 
in these circumstances is untenable. 
Such a conclusion is incongruent with the nature of cession discussed earlier.305 
If the debtor and creditor agree to insert a pactum de non cedendo into their agreement, 
whether this occurs at the time of conclusion of the contract or subsequently, the 
element of transmissibility will be removed from the rights concerned, rendering any 
purported cession thereof ineffective.306  
In relation to a right which is created as non-transferable nothing prevents the 
original parties to the agreement, that is, the debtor and creditor, from agreeing to 
remove the pactum de non cedendo by mutual consent, why can the parties not 
reinstate the transferability of the rights concerned?307 The fact that a right is created as 
non-transferable, therefore, does not act as a complete bar to the transferability of the 
rights concerned, as the parties are still free to remove the pactum de non cedendo 
from their original agreement by mutual consent, why then does it matter that the right 
was created as non-transferable?308   
In light of the foregoing it is clear that Scott‟s proposed analysis is unconvincing, 
and that the distinction drawn between a pre-existing right in terms of which a pactum 
de non cedendo is superimposed onto, and a right that is born ab initio with a restriction 
on transfer, is illogical.  
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“The better distinction is that drawn by Nienaber between (a) a pactum in the agreement 
between debtor and creditor, A and B, creating the right purportedly being ceded, and 
(b) a pactum between creditor/cedent B and cessionary C, in the obligationary 
agreement that preceded or accompanied the act of cession. The reason why the nemo 
plus iuris principle cannot apply in the latter situation – and thus why a pactum cannot 
prevent a transfer of the right to the third party C – is not because a restraint on 
alienation cannot be imposed on an existing right originally created as transferable (as 
Scott would have it). Rather, it is because the content of the right can be changed only 
by the parties to the obligation. Thus, A and B might agree to superimpose a pactum on 
a right which they originally created as a transferable right; so too if B were to cede the 
right to C, C and A might agree that the right is henceforth to be non-transferable; but B 
and C cannot by agreement between themselves change the content of the obligation 
between A and B (or for that matter between A and C)”.309 
Unfortunately, these criticisms were not grasped by the courts in Capespan and 
Born Free Investments, who unequivocally accepted Scott‟s views as to the correct 
approach to be adopted in South African law.310 
 
2.9 Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en ‘n ander v 
Booyens 
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This case concerned a private company, Markplaas (Edms) Bpk, which had two 
shareholders, Smuts and Roux, who each had a 50% share in the company, and were 
its only directors. 
In 1993 Roux entered into a sale agreement with Booyens, in terms of which 
Roux agreed to sell his shares in the company to Booyens. Smuts was unaware of this 
transaction.  
Later in January 1994 Roux concluded a second transaction in terms of which he 
agreed to cede the same shares as security for a loan he obtained. In September 1994 
Roux was provisionally sequestrated, and in October 1994 the provisional sequestration 
order was made final. Subsequently, Roux collected his share certificate from the 
auditors of Markplaas and delivered it to Booyens. 
In the court a quo Smuts‟s application to set aside the sale agreement was 
dismissed. Smut argued that the sale agreement was invalid because Roux had failed 
to comply with a provision in the company‟s articles of association relating to the sale of 
shares. The court a quo rejected this argument and held that the conclusion of the sale 
agreement entitled Booyens to the shares, and, therefore, at least prima facie, entitled 
him to have his name inserted in the share register. 
Smuts appealed the decision of the court a quo, persisting in the argument that, 
the company‟s articles of association contained an agreement not to transfer the rights 
in the company (that is, the shares) unless the correct procedure was followed, and that 
Roux‟s failure to follow the procedure set out in the articles of association precluded 
Booyens from becoming entitled to the shares. 
P a g e  | 72 
 
The unanimous judgment of the court was delivered by Cameron JA.  
Cameron JA explicated that s 20 of Companies Act311 obliged a private company 
to restrict the transferability of its shares, and that this restriction was a vital 
characteristic of a private company.312 
Cameron JA held that the word „transfer‟ in the Companies Act should be given 
its „full‟ and „technical‟ meaning.313 He held that transfer encompassed a number of 
steps: firstly, it entailed an agreement to transfer, secondly, it included the execution of 
a deed of transfer, and finally, the registration of the transfer.314 Cameron JA held that if 
the restrictions imposed by the Act and the company‟s articles of association were not 
complied with the shares would be completely non-transferable.315 
In terms of the company‟s articles of association any shareholder wishing to sell 
his shares must first offer the shares to the existing shareholders before offering them to 
any third party.316 In other words, the shareholders of a private company have a right of 
pre-emption to the sale of any shares in their company.317  
The court in this case equated the right of pre-emption contained in the 
company‟s Articles of Association, which is treated as a contract between the members 
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inter se, to a pactum de non cedendo.318 The court stated that the pactum de non 
cedendo was valid as the company had an interest in it.319 In regard to the issue of 
transferability the court held that the restriction on transfer existed when the shares 
were created.320 The shares therefore, lacked the characteristic of transferability.321 
Therefore, both the purported cession to Booyens and the security cession to the 
third party did not transfer Roux‟s shares in the company as Roux had failed to first offer 
Smut‟s the option of purchasing his shares before he purported to sell them to 
Booyens.322 The court, therefore, set aside both the purported cession and security 
cession, respectively.  
 
2.10 Capespan (Pty) Ltd v Any Name 451 (Pty) Ltd323 
This case concerned two companies, Chance Brothers (Pty) Ltd and Club 
Champion Investments (Pty) Ltd, who each concluded separate marketing agreements 
with Capespan. Both marketing agreements contained similar terms. In 2001 a dispute 
arose between Chance Brothers and Club Champion on the one hand, and Capespan 
on the other. Chance Brothers and Club Champion alleged that Capespan had 
breached certain clauses of their respective marketing agreements. Arbitration 












 Capespan supra note 56. 
P a g e  | 74 
 
proceedings did initially commence but were never completed, and in December 2002 
both Chance Brothers and Club Champion were placed under provisional liquidation, 
which were subsequently made final. Joint liquidators were appointed to wind-up the 
companies. In September 2005 the liquidators purported to cede the rights arising from 
the respective marketing agreements to Any Name 451. 
Both marketing agreements contained a clause prohibiting the cession of any 
rights arising from the marketing agreement without the consent of Capespan.324 It was 
common cause that Capespan had not consented to the cessions.325 Therefore, the 
central issue in this case was the validity of the pactum de non cedendo.326 
In the court a quo Any Name 451 brought an application that it be substituted for 
Club Champion Investments and Chance Brothers. Capespan objected to the 
substitution, inter alia, on the ground that such a substitution was prohibited by clause 
16 of their respective agreements with each company.  
Zondi AJ, on the authority of Paiges, held that the prohibition only contemplated 
a voluntary cession and did not encompass an involuntary cession.327 On this basis 
Zondi AJ held that the liquidators were, therefore, not prevented by the pactum de non 
cedendo from ceding the rights of the liquidated companies to Any Name 451. 
On the authority of Lithins328, Zondi AJ stated the following: 
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“A pactum de non cedendo does not bind the liquidator who alienates and cedes the 
contractual right pursuant to his duties as liquidator in insolvency unless it appears in a 
lease, in which case section 37(5) of the Insolvency Act329 applies, or unless it appears 
from the pactum that it would also be applicable in the case of insolvency”. 
 
In Zondi AJ‟s view clause 16 could not be interpreted as being binding on the 
liquidators on insolvency. Therefore, he held that the liquidators were free to cede the 
respective rights of the liquidated companies to Any Name 451.330 
Capespan appealed to the Full Bench. The unanimous judgment of Thring J, 
however, took a very different view to that of the court a quo in this matter.331  
Thring J agreed with Zondi AJ‟s observations that a pactum de non cedendo will 
not always bind a liquidator in insolvency, unless the pactum de non cedendo is 
included in a lease agreement or where the pactum de non cedendo expressly 
stipulates that it will bind a liquidator or trustee on insolvency.332 However, Thring J 
stated that there was a third instance in which a pactum de non cedendo could triumph 
against insolvency, which Zondi AJ overlooked.333 
Thring J criticised Zondi AJ‟s reliance on Paiges as authority for the view that an 
involuntary cession could not be precluded by a pactum de non cedendo. In his view, 
De Villiers JA in Paiges, was merely stating that a pactum de non cedendo cannot 
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prevent the rights from vesting in a trustee or liquidator on insolvency, as this occurs by 
operation of law.334 Thring J stated that De Villiers JA‟s judgment could not be 
interpreted as authority for the proposition that a pactum de non cedendo did not bind a 
liquidator or trustee in insolvency.335 
In formulating the third instance in which a pactum de non cedendo would bind a 
trustee or liquidator in insolvency, Thring J began his exposition of the law by discussing 
whether the decision in Trust Bank constituted a departure from the Paiges judgement. 
Thring J stated that the court in Trust Bank held that where a right is created with a 
prohibition against cession the debtor would not be required to prove an interest 
because the right was limited by the stipulation.336 
Thereafter, the court explicitly endorsed Scott‟s views on the validity and effect of 
a pactum de non cedendo in these circumstances, and quoted with approval the 
aforementioned passages in her textbook.337 The court justified its adoption of Scott‟s 
view, inter alia, on the following grounds. First, the court explained that Scott‟s views 
were both congruent and positively supported by the case law.338 Second, Scott‟s view 
was in line with the courts‟ approach to freedom of contract, that is, “the maxim pacta 
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sunt servanda is still a cornerstone of our law of contract”.339 Third, Scott‟s view was 
supported by some decisions at local and provincial level, for example, Italtrafo SpA.340 
 
In summation Thring J stated the following: 
“first, that a distinction must be drawn between a pactum de non cedendo which 
prohibits the cession of an existing right, i.e. one which pre-existed the conclusion of the 
pactum, on the one hand, and a pactum de non cedendo of a right which, by means of 
the pactum itself, was created ab initio as a non-transferable right, on the other. In the 
case of the first pactum, that which relates to an existing right, It will not always be 
enforceable; in particular, it will not bind the trustee in insolvency or the liquidator of the 
creditor and prevent him from executing a valid "involuntary" cession of the right to a 
third party in the course of carrying out his duties as trustee or liquidator. However, in the 
case of the second type of pactum, that which relates to a right which was created ab 
initio as a non-transferable right, the pactum is valid and enforceable against the world 
because the right is simply inherently incapable of being transferred by anyone; and a 
cession of such a right contrary to the pactum will be putative, and of no force or effect, 
even if it is a so-called "involuntary" cession; in other words, it will bind even a trustee in 
insolvency or a liquidator of the creditor. I hasten to add that I do not use the term 
"involuntary cession" to include the vesting of an insolvent's assets in his trustee, which 
takes place, not by an act of cession, but automatically, by operation of law, as was 
mentioned in Paiges' case, loc cit: the term as I understand it refers now to an attempt 
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by a trustee or liquidator to transfer the right concerned, by means of cession, to a third 
party.”341 
 
Thring J, therefore, recognised a third instance in which a pactum de non 
cedendo would bind a trustee or liquidator in insolvency: where the right was created ab 
initio as non-transferable, the pactum de non cedendo would prevent even an 
involuntary cession.342 
In application to the facts of the case the court held that the rights were created 
ab initio as non-transferable, and were consequently binding on the liquidators.343 The 
purported cessions were, therefore, invalid and ineffectual in transferring the rights.344 
The full bench in Capespan, therefore, failed to recognise the deficiencies in Scott‟s 
proposed solution that were discussed earlier. The Supreme Court of Appeal had the 
opportunity to state its views on the law relating to pacta de non cedendo in the seminal 
decision of Born Free Investments.  
 
2.11 Scott’s Solution (2008) 
The decision in Capespan, in which the court unequivocally accepted Scott‟s 
initial solution to the problems in the doctrine of pacta de non cedendo, prompted Scott 
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to re-evaluate her position as to the correct approach.345 In an ironic twist of events, 
Scott has now for the first time unequivocally changed her view, and now proposes an 
approach that is essentially346 antithetical to her prior position.347  
After conducting a comparative analysis of the law as expressed in certain 
continental and international instruments, as well as the approaches in some of the 
leading foreign jurisdictions, Scott questioned the wisdom of allowing parties the 
freedom to create rights that are completely non-transferable.348 She states that, “This 
kind of agreement prohibiting cession is the bone of contention since it inhibits the 
smooth operation of factoring and securitisation”.349  
From the perspective of the law of obligations, the principle of freedom of 
contract entitles parties to determine the contents of their agreement, provided such an 
agreement falls “within the boundaries set by law”.350 Although Scott acknowledges that 
pacta de non cedendo may be held invalid, inter alia, on the ground that such an 
agreement may be contrary to public policy, she states that in principle she can see no 
reason why such agreements should be contrary to public policy.351 Once the validity of 
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the pactum de non cedendo has been established inter partes, the parties to the 
agreement are bound due to the operation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda.352 
However, Scott argues that the contentious issue is whether it is contrary to 
public policy to allow the parties to the agreement “to re-instate the personal nature of 
their obligation in such a way that their agreement is effective against third parties”.353 In 
light of the trend internationally, Scott proposes the following solution: pacta de non 
cedendo should be accorded validity inter partes due to the operation of the principle of 
freedom of contract.354 Any cession concluded contrary to such an agreement will give 
the innocent party a claim for breach of contract against the guilty party, and where 
appropriate a right to claim damages.355 However, such an agreement should not 
prevent transfer to a third party unless, “the debtor has an interest in re-instating the 
personal nature of the obligation”, which may be re-instated in the agreement creating 
the claim.356 
 2.12 Sunkel’s Solution 
Sunkel argues that the current state of the South African law on the validity and 
effect of pacta de non cedendo is out of sync with international developments in this 
area of law.357 Sunkel proposes that South African law follow the U.S‟s lead in drawing 
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a distinction between general contracts and commercial contracts.358 She argues that 
South African Law should adopt the view that pacta de non cedendo contained in 
commercial contracts should be considered invalid inter partes, and should not prevent 
transfer to a third party.359 In other words, a pactum de non cedendo contained in a 
commercial contract will have no legal effect whatsoever.360 
In relation to general contracts Sunkel proposes that South African Law adopt the 
default position in U.S law.361 That is, a pactum de non cedendo contained in a general 
contract should not prevent transfer to a third party.362 However, it will result in a claim 
for breach of contract against the cedent by his debtor.363 Furthermore, damages may 
be claimed, if it can be proven.364 Sunkel, however, argues, in contrast to the approach 
taken in American law, that the parties should not be able to depart from the default 
position that a pactum de non cedendo would not prevent transfer to a third party, by 
manifesting an intention that their agreement will prevent transfer to a third party. She 
argues that if South African law were to adopt such a position it would introduce 
uncertainty into our law. 
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Sunkel argues that if South African law adopts this position the interest 
requirement would be rendered redundant, and should therefore, be abandoned.365 
Sunkel is of the view that this approach could be incorporated into South African Law 
through a judicial decision.366 Sunkel however, fails to explain exactly how such 
wholesale changes to the South African law are to be achieved. 
 
2.13 Born Free Investments 364 (Pty) Limited v Firstrand Bank 
Limited367 
The facts of this case were virtually identical to that in Capespan. The case 
concerned two companies in liquidation: Summer Season Trading 49 (Pty) Ltd and 
Central Lake Trading 256 (Pty) Ltd. These companies had borrowed money from 
Firstrand Bank, and at the time of liquidation owed R49, 2 million and R25, 1 million, 
respectively. Later the liquidators of these companies ceded their rights arising out of 
their respective loan agreements to Born Free Investments, who alleged that Firstrand 
Bank had repudiated both of the loan agreements causing the companies to suffer 
losses of R109, 2 million and R69, 1 million, respectively. 
In pursuance of the cessions Born Free Investments instituted action against 
Firstrand Bank in the South Gauteng High Court. In the High Court Born Free 
Investments action was dismissed, inter alia, on the basis that each of the loan 
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agreements contained a pactum de non cedendo, which rendered the rights concerned 
non-transferable.368 That is, the pactum de non cedendo was binding upon the 
liquidators of the insolvent estate.369  
In the Supreme Court of Appeal Born Free Investments argued that a pactum de 
non cedendo cannot prevent a liquidator, who in the execution of his duties as a 
liquidator, cedes a contractual right to a third party.370 Ponnan JA, delivering the 
unanimous judgment of the court, rejected this argument for exactly the same reasons 
as those expressed by the court in Capespan.371 The court concluded that the rights in 
question were created ab initio as non-transferable rights, and the application of the 
nemo plus iuris principle meant that the liquidator as cessionary could have no greater 
rights than the cedent himself had, as he merely stepped into the cedent‟s shoes. 
In order to justify his conclusion Ponnan JA cited the above-quoted passage372 
from the judgment of Thring J in Capespan, and in relation to the application of the 
nemo plus iuris principle he quoted passages from the judgments in Paiges and Trust 
Bank.373 
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In application of the foregoing to the facts of the case the SCA concluded that the 
rights concerned were created ab initio as non-transferable rights.374 Therefore, the 
purported cessions were invalid and of no force and effect.375 Thus, the appeal was 
dismissed.376 
Intriguingly, Ponnan JA quoted and referred to, but did not comment on, Scott‟s views 
as expressed by her subsequent to the decision in Capespan, in terms of which she 
advocates an approach to pacta de non cedendo fundamentally different from that 
proposed by her previously, as discussed above at 2.11.377 
Furthermore, Ponnan JA did not himself explicitly express a view on the 
controversial interest requirement, even though he implicitly endorsed the view that 
when a right is created as a non-transferable right the interest requirement is 
inapplicable.378 This leads Hutchison to surmise that perhaps the court in this case 
“preferred to leave the matter open for consideration in a subsequent case”.379 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, like the court in Capespan, once again failed to 
recognise the deficiencies in the Scott‟s reasoning. The resultant effect of this judgment 
is that Scott‟s views have now been elevated to being the national precedence, even 
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though her assertions, are in my view, unconvincing and illogical. The current position 
is, therefore, in my view, unsatisfactory and most distressing. 
 
2.14 Hutchison’s Solution 
The recent contribution by Hutchison is, in my opinion, the most erudite and 
elucidating proposed solution to address the deficiencies in the doctrine of pacta de non 
cedendo proffered thus far. Hutchison states that the central issues to be determined 
when dealing with pacta de non cedendo are the following: “should pacta de non 
cedendo always be accorded validity; and should they in any event be effective to 
preclude a transfer of the right to a third party?”380 
Hutchison argues that in order for a pactum de non cedendo to be accorded 
validity inter partes the debtor must demonstrate a substantial interest that is served by 
the restriction.381 Hutchison criticises the view, espoused by numerous commentators 
and even the courts, that the debtor will always have an interest in knowing the identity 
of his creditor, and states that such an interpretation is certainly not what De Villiers JA 
envisaged in Paiges, he argues that the debtor must prove a “substantial interest”.382 
However, even if the debtor is able to prove a substantial interest in the 
stipulation, the modern public policy test should be utilised to take cognisance of the 
interests of other parties as well as the broader interests of society in general, these 
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interests should then be weighed against the interest of the debtor in order to determine 
whether the pactum de non cedendo is contrary to public policy.383 Furthermore, the 
importance of trade credit, in the form of book debt financing, to the modern economy 
should be considered in determining whether the pactum de non cedendo is contrary to 
public policy.384  
If a pactum de non cedendo is held to be valid inter partes the next issue is to 
determine whether the pactum de non cedendo is effective in preventing transfer to a 
third party.385 In determining whether the pactum de non cedendo has such an effect 
Hutchison states that two legal devices should be employed: firstly the courts should 
adopt a restrictive interpretation to pacta de non cedendo; and secondly, the modern 
public policy approach should be employed.386 
“In this regard, it is important to recognise that a restraint can be effective against a third 
party only if it limits the right by taking out the element of transferability. If it was intended 
to restrict merely the creditor‟s right to effect a transfer, rather than his competence to do 
so, then it does not limit the right and the restraint can have effect only inter partes. 
There will generally be little objection to the validity of such a provision. However, if or in 
so far as the restraint was intended to prevent a transfer of the right to a third party, such 
a provision might well be considered contrary to public policy, depending on the 
circumstances of the case. The interests of all the parties involved would have to be 
taken into account – not merely those of the party imposing the restraint – as well as 
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broader considerations of commerce and public policy. In regard to debts sounding in 
money, the submission will be that the restraint should be held invalid to the extent that it 
purports to prevent a transfer of the right unless the debtor can demonstrate a very real 
and substantial interest in preserving the personal nature of the obligation”.387 
Hutchison is optimistic that his proposed solution can be incorporated into the 
South African law through judicial development of the law.388 
As will be illustrated in Chapter 3, Hutchison‟s proposed solution is synonymous 
with the approach taken in the United States. However, the fundamental difference 
between the two approaches is that the American approach was incorporated into 
American Law through the promulgation of legislation, whereas Hutchison seeks to 
incorporate the same approach into South African law by employing the modern 
concept of public policy, and by taking a restrictive interpretation of pacta de non 
cedendo. 
I am, however, pessimistic that the South African courts‟ would be inclined to 
take such far reaching reform of the law through judicial development, and in my opinion 
such a comprehensive reform of the South African law is best left to the legislature, as 
opined by Scott.389 My pessimism stems from the current apathy of the courts in failing 
to properly utilise the modern concept of public policy, in determining the validity of 
pacta de non cedendo inter partes, let alone its application in determining the 
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effectiveness of pacta de non cedendo in preventing transfer of the rights to a third 
party. 
Furthermore, the courts‟ in the United States are not in conformity as to what 
constitutes a “manifest intention” to depart from the default position that pacta de non 
cedendo are only valid inter partes and cannot prevent transfer of the rights to a third 
party.390 In order to determine whether the parties who concluded the pactum de non 
cedendo did indeed intend for the pactum de non cedendo to restrict the capacity of the 
creditor, and thereby prevent any transfer of the rights to a third party, three different 
approaches have been advocated by the courts.391 This divergence of the United States 
courts‟ has certainly infused a degree of uncertainty into their law, and casts doubt on 
the utility of their approach being incorporated into South African law through judicial 
development. If the American courts‟ cannot agree on the correct approach to be taken 
in these circumstances, irrespective of the fact that their law is governed by legislation, 
what chance then does South African law have of establishing a uniform approach 
through judicial development?  
As alluded to earlier, Hutchison argues that a restrictive interpretation should be 
adopted in determining whether the pactum de non cedendo has limited the creditor‟s 
capacity to cede the rights concerned, or whether it merely sought to restrict his right to 
do so. In my view recourse to a restrictive interpretation is indicative that one is dealing 
with a fiction, and that the courts are no longer interpreting the contract, rather they are 
making the contract.  
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In light of the foregoing criticisms I am unable to agree with Hutchison that his 
approach may be incorporated into South African law through judicial development. The 
fundamental problem with such a development is that if a court unequivocally embraces 
Hutchison‟s approach such a decision would declare what the law has always been, 
and would have disastrous consequences for all debtors who have concluded pacta de 
non cedendo prior to such a decision. In other words, debtors who intended such pacta 
de non cedendo to prevent transfer of the right to a third party, but did not clearly 
express their intention in the wording of the stipulation, will be held to only have 
restricted the creditor‟s right to effect transfer and not his capacity to do so.  
In almost all of the cases I have considered all of the pacta de non cedendo have 
been formulated in a manner that may be said to only restrict the creditor‟s right and not 
his capacity to effect transfer of the rights concerned, however, the courts in these 
cases have held that these creditors are unable to effect transfer due to the presence of 
the pactum de non cedendo concluded between the debtor and creditor. Therefore, if 
Hutchison‟s approach is adopted all debtors would be required to reformulate their 
respective pacta de non cedendo if they intended their respective pacta de non 
cedendo to restrict the capacity of their creditors to effect transfer in these 
circumstances. In order to accomplish this, these debtors would require the consent of 
their respective creditors‟, who may be unwilling to consent to such reformulation. 
In light of the fact that such a distinction, as Hutchison points out392, has never 
been drawn by the courts this will result in inequity. Whereas, if Hutchison‟s approach is 
promulgated in legislation, this would allow pacta de non cedendo concluded prior to 
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such promulgation to be uninhibited by the reform, as such legislation would not have 
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Chapter 3: Comparative analysis 
 
In this chapter I will briefly set out and analyse the approach taken to the validity 
and effect of pacta de non cedendo in certain international instruments, as well as the 
approach taken by some of the leading jurisdictions. 
 
 3.1 UNIDROIT Factoring Convention 
“The UNIDROIT Factoring Convention applies to the assignment of receivables pursuant 
to a factoring contract whenever the receivables arise from a contract of sale of goods 
between the assignor and one of her customers whose place of business are in different 
states”.393  
Article 6(1) states than an assignment of a receivable by a supplier/creditor to a 
factor/cessionary effectively transfers the right, irrespective of the presence of a pactum 
de non cedendo that has been concluded between the debtor and creditor.394 In other 
words the right is effectively transferred from the creditor to the factor. However, in 
terms of Article 6(3) the ant-assignment clause is nevertheless valid inter partes, 
therefore, any assignment of such rights constitutes a breach of contract by the creditor, 
which may entitle the debtor to hold the creditor liable damages.395Such an assignment 
will not, however, be effective against a debtor if “the debtor has a place of business in 
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a Contracting State which has made a declaration under Article 18 of this 
Convention”.396 
 
 3.2 UNCITRAL Assignment of Receivables Convention 
This convention is applicable to both the assignment of international receivables 
and international assignments of receivables, where the parties to the agreement are 
located in different states.397  
In terms of Article 6 the assignor, assignee and debtor may agree to derogate or 
vary from, the default position in the Convention, in relation to their respective rights and 
obligations.398 However, such an agreement does not affect the rights and obligations of 
any person not privy to such an agreement.399 
In terms of Article 9(1) any assignment of a receivable is effective irrespective of 
any agreement limiting the assignor‟s ability to assign its rights.400 Furthermore, Article 
9(1) applies irrespective of whether the anti-assignment clause pertains to pre-existing 
right or rights created with a restriction on assignment.401 Therefore, anti-assignment 
clauses only operate inter partes, and cannot prevent transfer of the right to a third 
party.402 
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 3.3 UNIDROIT PICC 
The UNIDROIT PICC is a set of general rules that parties may rely on when 
concluding international commercial contracts.403 These rules are applied when 
contractants agree that their contract will be governed by them.404 Furthermore, these 
rules may be used as a model by national and international legislators, and may be 
used as an interpretive guide in interpreting international instruments and even 
domestic law.405 
Chapter 9 of the UNIDROIT PICC deals extensively will nearly all aspects of 
assignment of receivables.406 This chapter covers both the outright assignment of rights, 
on the one hand, and security assignments on the other.407  
In terms of Article 9.1.9 an assignment of a right to receive a sum of money 
effectively transfers these rights to the assignee irrespective of an agreement concluded 
between the assignor and debtor limiting or prohibiting the assignment of the rights 
concerned.408 The assignor may, however, be held liable by the debtor for breach of 
contract.409 If, however, the rights being assigned do not pertain to the payment of a 
monetary sum, and the debtor and assignor have concluded an ant-assignment clause, 
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any purported assignment from the assignor to the assignee is ineffective.410 Such an 
assignment will, however, be effective if the assignee neither knew nor ought to have 
known of the presence of an anti-assignment clause at the time of assignment.411 In 
these circumstances the assignor may be held liable for breach of contract by his 
debtor.412 
 
 3.4 American Law 
The American approach to the validity and effect of pacta de non cedendo is 
considered to be the leading system in the world. In the United States a distinction is 
drawn between “General” contracts and “Commercial” contracts.413 The effect of this 
distinction is that the validity and effect of a pacta de non cedendo differs depending on 
which category of contracts the impugned provision falls into.414  
General contracts refer to all contracts which are not factoring contracts.415 Pacta 
de non cedendo contained in general contracts are all treated uniformly under the 
Second Restatement of Contracts.416 Therefore, in the U.S all pacta de non cedendo  
contained in general contracts are treated uniformly, the only exception being 
commercial contracts.417 
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The U.S approach to the validity of pacta de non cedendo contained in general 
contracts is governed by s 332(2)(b) of the Second Restatement of Contracts.418 
Section 332(2)(b) states that “if a contract prohibits the assignment of a right and a 
contracting party assigns the right regardless of the prohibition, then, unless a different 
intention is manifested, the debtor is entitled to damages for breach of the contract, but 
the breach does not render the assignment ineffective.”419 Therefore, the default 
position in the U.S in relation to general contracts is that a pactum de non cedendo 
does not prevent the transfer of a right transferred in violation of the pactum de non 
cedendo.420 It does, however, provide a claim for damages to the debtor who has 
suffered loss as a result of the breach of contract by his creditor.421 
This so-called “modern approach” does, however, allow parties to deviate from 
the default position where the parties manifest a different intention.422 Exactly what 
constitutes a “manifest intention” to depart from the default position has been heavily 
debated.423 The American courts have proposed three different interpretative 
approaches in this regard: 
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Firstly, in terms of the “Allhusen424 or Rumbin v Utica425 minority approach” the 
parties to the agreement are merely required to use general terms to clearly and 
unambiguously convey their intention to render the right non-transferable, and 
consequently prevent any purported transfer of the right to a third party.426 An example 
of an anti-assignment clause employing such general terms is the following: “[n]o 
payment under this annuity contract may be…assigned…in any manner by the 
[plaintiff]”.427 
The second interpretative approach proposed by the American courts is the so-
called “magic words approach”.428 In terms of this approach parties who desire to render 
the rights created in their agreement non-transferable must employ specific words in 
formulating their anti-assignment clause.429 For example, the anti-assignment clause 
may state that any purported assignment is “void” or “invalid” or “ineffective”.430 
Thirdly, in terms of the so-called “Illinois approach” contractants are not required 
to employ general or specific words in order to render their rights non-transferable in 
formulating their anti-assignment clause.431 Instead, the courts should adopt a more 
holistic approach and should take cognisance of all factors as well as the surrounding 
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circumstances of the case in order to determine whether the parties desired to render 
the personal rights concerned non-transferable.432 
The apparent lack of consensus amongst the American courts has injected a 
considerable amount of uncertainty into their law in this respect.433   
The validity and effect of a pactum de non cedendo contained in a commercial 
contract is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).434 The UCC “is a model 
piece of statutory law that governs certain types of contracts dealing with commercial 
transactions and payment with the purpose of unifying the laws of such commercial 
transactions across all the states of America.”435 Assignments of a commercial nature 
are governed by Article 9 of the UCC, whereas Article 9-406(d)(1) deals with the validity 
and effect of an anti-assignment clause.436 In CGU Life Insurance Co of America v 
Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities Co the court stated that the effect of Article 9-
406(d)(1) is that:  
“A term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective if it 
prohibits assignment of an account or prohibits creation of a security interest in a general 
intangible for money due or to become due or requires the consent of the account debtor 
to such assignment or security interest.”437 
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The term “account" is defined as a “right to payment of a monetary obligation 
arising out of a closed list of obligations”.438 This closed list incudes, for example, 
monetary claims arising from a contract of sale or lease that is due or will become 
due.439 Furthermore, certain claims are expressly excluded from the definition of 
“account”, for example, health care receivables.440 
Article 9-406(d)(1) therefore, encompasses what in the U.S is referred to as 
“accounts receivable”, and in South Africa is referred to as “book debts”.441 Book debts 
refer to monies owed by debtors to their creditors arising most commonly from hire-
purchase agreements or services which have been rendered.442  
In terms of the American approach to commercial contracts all anti-assignment 
clauses are invalid inter partes and therefore have no effect whatsoever.443 The 
underlying rationale of this approach may be summarised in the following terms:  
“Accounts and other simple written promises to pay are important collateral in modern 
commercial transactions, and their value as collateral is maximized by stripping them of 
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3.5 German Law 
In German law the following three situations must be differentiated: firstly, in the 
domestic context, when a right is created as non-transferable, that is, the right is 
created with a prohibition on transfer, any purported cession thereof is ineffective in 
terms of paragraph 399 of the BGB.445  
Secondly, in cases where both the assignor and debtor are merchants, or the 
debtor is a state institution, an agreement prohibiting cession is only valid inter partes, 
consequently any transfer made to a third party is effective.446 There is, however, one 
exception, the debtor may validly discharge his obligation by making payment to the 
cedent in these circumstances.447 
Thirdly, in light of the fact that Germany has ratified the UNIDROIT Factoring 
Convention all agreements prohibiting cession are only operative inter partes and 
consequently do not invalidate the transfer of the right to a third party.448 
Due to its recognition of the importance of claims in the commercial world the 
German courts have a tendency to interpret paragraph 399 of the BGB restrictively.449 
In cases where a debtor has no interest in the prohibition the validity of the prohibition 
has been challenged on the basis that the term is unreasonable or on the basis of the 
doctrine of abuse of rights.450 
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3.6 French Law 
French law views the law of cession as an aspect of the law of property since it 
concerns the transfer of an incorporeal asset.451 Consequently, agreements that prohibit 
cession are viewed with disfavour since such agreements ignore the fundamental 
property law principle that things should not be removed from commerce.452  
Again, three situations must be distinguished: firstly, in terms of the Civil Code 
agreements prohibiting cession only operate inter partes, and therefore, do not preclude 
transfer to the cessionary.453 
Secondly, if the debtor is a producer, merchant, industrialist or craftsman, then in 
terms of article L442-6 any agreement prohibiting cession has no effect whatsoever, 
that is, it is not valid even inter partes.454 
Lastly, because France is a signatory of the UNIDROIT Factoring Convention it 
was entitled to make a declaration under Article 18, and has done so, therefore, an 
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Chapter 4: Criticism, Analysis and Conclusion 
The fundamental aim of this paper was to set out the current South African law 
on pacta de non cedendo with a view to elucidating the problems and deficiencies in our 
law, and then to provide a possible solution to address these issues. One of the most 
important objectives of my proposed solution was to address the needs of commerce by 
viewing the law of cession generally, and the doctrine of pacta de non cedendo 
specifically, through a constitutional lens, as mandated by our Constitution. Section 
39(2) obliges a court to develop the common law when it fails to promote the objectives 
under s 39(2). In my opinion, the common law doctrine of pacta de non cedendo fails to 
promote these objectives and is, therefore, in need of development. 
 
 4.1 Current Law 
In terms of the current law a pactum de non cedendo will only be accorded 
validity if the debtor is able to demonstrate a substantial interest in the prohibition. 
However, the interest requirement is only applicable if the pactum de non cedendo is 
superimposed onto a pre-existing right. When a right is born ab initio with a prohibition 
on transfer the pactum de non cedendo is automatically valid without the need for the 
debtor to prove an interest in the stipulation. Once the pactum de non cedendo has 
been accorded validity inter partes the application of the nemo plus iuris principle 
renders any purported cession thereof ineffectual, irrespective of the distinction drawn 
between pre-existing rights and rights created with a prohibition on transfer. 
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4.2 Major criticisms of the current law 
Firstly, by requiring the debtor to prove an interest before the pactum de non de 
non cedendo may be accorded validity, our law unfairly discriminates between debtors 
in these circumstances and all other contracting parties, arbitrarily. 
Why should debtors who seek to rely on pacta de non cedendo be required to 
jump over the additional hurdle of the “interest requirement” when no other contracting 
party is required to do so in any other circumstance? This requirement fails to promote 
the value of equality. 
Secondly, the current law fails to facilitate economic development, as pacta de 
non cedendo that restrict or prohibit the transfer of book debts and other similar debts 
sounding in money, are currently valid and enforceable. 
Thirdly, the distinction drawn, inter alia, by the Supreme Court of Appeal between 
a pactum de non cedendo that is superimposed onto a pre-existing right and a right that 
is created with a prohibition on transfer is completely illogical and should be excised 
from our law.  
Lastly, the obiter dicta by, inter alia, the Supreme Court of Appeal that in relation 
to pre-existing rights, in terms of which a pactum de non cedendo has been 
superimposed onto, that even if the debtor is able to prove an interest in the prohibition 
transfer to the cessionary would not be prevented, is fundamentally flawed and 
incommensurate with the nature of cession. Once a valid pactum de non cedendo has 
been concluded between the debtor and creditor to the agreement it will prevent 
transfer of the right to the cessionary as the element of transferability has been 
removed. 
P a g e  | 103 
 
  4.3 My Solution 
In my opinion all pacta de non cedendo should be analysed in terms of the 
following two-step approach: first, the validity of the pactum de non cedendo inter partes 
should be determined. Secondly, if the pactum de non cedendo is valid inter partes, it 
should then be determined if the pactum de non cedendo is effective in preventing 
transfer to a third party. 
(a) Validity inter partes 
Due to the fact that the interest requirement unfairly discriminates against parties who 
conclude pacta de non cedendo, in contradistinction to all other contracting parties, the 
interest requirement should be subsumed into the public policy enquiry. By subsuming 
the interest requirement into the public policy enquiry the court will be able to weigh up 
the interests of the debtor in enforcing the clause; against the interests of all other 
parties affected by the transaction as well as the broader interests of society, in not 
enforcing the clause, in determining whether the clause is unlawful. As Van Huyssteen 
has indicated: 
“…underlying the approach of the courts to pacta de non cedendo is an assumption that 
a contractual restriction of a creditor‟s capacity to dispose of a right is contrary to public 
policy unless justified by some legitimate interest of the person in whose favour the 
restriction is imposed”.456 
In this regard I submit that all pacta de non cedendo that prohibit the transfer of 
debts sounding in money, such as book debts, should be held to be contrary to public 
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policy in light of the numerous benefits to society that will be obtained through the free 
flow of trade credit. This will allow the factoring and securitisation industries to flourish.   
I am cognisant of the fact that Joubert and Roussouw have proposed similar 
solutions to overcome the problems inherent in the interest requirement, and that their 
views have not enjoyed the attention of the courts. However, I believe that this view, 
that the validity of a pactum de non cedendo inter partes should only be assessed 
against the contractual requirement of legality, has a renewed impetus, in light of South 
Africa‟s constitutional imperatives and the contemporary application of the public policy 
enquiry.  
I do not however, accept Roussouw and Sunkels‟ views that the interest 
requirement should be completely jettisoned from our law. The interest “requirement” is 
not irrelevant and may be relied upon as a factor to illustrate that the stipulation is not 
contrary to public policy. I take solace in the fact that my approach is consistent with the 
general approach taken internationally. 
(b) Effectiveness against third parties 
Internationally, the trend has been to take the following approach :a pactum de 
non cedendo should only operate inter partes but should not prevent transfer to a third 
party unless the parties clearly manifest an intention to re-instate the personal nature of 
the claim in order to prevent transfer to a third party. Furthermore, this approach has 
been endorsed by two of our country‟s most eminent academic commentators, 
Hutchison and Scott. 
Hutchison and Scott, however, differ on how exactly such whole scale reform 
may be incorporated into our law. Scott states that such a fundamental reform of the law 
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requires legislative intervention, whereas Hutchison believes that reform may be 
brought up through judicial development of the law. I am inclined to agree with Scott on 
this point. Unfortunately, the legislature has remained obstinate for decades, and as 
Hutchison opines legislative reform “is unlikely to be forthcoming in the foreseeable 
future”. Therefore, our law requires a solution to the problems in our law that may be 
incorporated through judicial development of the law. 
In my view, the current approach taken in determining the effectiveness of a 
pactum de non cedendo should be retained: once it has been concluded that the 
pactum de non cedendo is valid inter partes the operation of the nemo plus iuris 
principle would render any purported cession thereof ineffective. However, if the debtor 
and creditor omit to include a pactum de non cedendo in their agreement but the cedent 
and cessionary conclude a pactum de non cedendo such a clause will only operate inter 
partes and will not prevent transfer to a third party as only the debtor and creditor may 
validly remove the element of transferability from the rights concerned. 
 
 4.4 Conclusion 
It is my firm contention that my proposed analysis will resolve all of the problems 
and inconsistencies in our law, and that it may be easily assimilated into our law, for the 
following reasons: 
Firstly, my approach is mandated by s 39(2) of the Constitution. Secondly, my 
approach merely requires the courts to apply the modern public policy enquiry to pacta 
de non cedendo. Thirdly, it will promote economic growth by invalidating all pacta de 
non cedendo appearing in claims sounding in money. Finally, commercial certainty in 
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this area of the law will be enhanced by only assessing the validity of pacta de non 
cedendo inter partes against the requirement of legality, and by retaining the 
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